Shattering the Glass Ceiling in International Adjudication by Grossman, Nienke
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
2016
Shattering the Glass Ceiling in International
Adjudication
Nienke Grossman
University of Baltimore School of Law, ngrossman@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Courts Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shattering the Glass Ceiling in International Adjudication, 56 Va. J. Int'l L. (forthcoming 2016)
   








The Article shows that women are found in dramatically low numbers 
on the benches of the majority of the world’s most important international 
courts, analyzes the causes of this phenomenon and proposes and evaluates 
solutions.  It establishes that the number of women in the pool of potential 
judges does not appear to dictate how many women become international 
judges. It shows, too, that when selection procedures are closed and 
opaque, and there is no quota or aspirational target for a sex-balanced 
bench, women obtain international judgeships in disproportionately low 
numbers. On the other hand, when a quota or aspirational target exists, 
benches are more balanced.  Finally, the Article suggests and evaluates 
concrete reforms to selection procedures on international courts to remedy 
this problem, including greater transparency and openness in selection 
procedures, aspirational targets for the participation of women on the 
bench and quotas.  It is the first article to explore the relationship between 
selection procedures and sex representativeness outcomes on international 
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Twenty-four years ago, Hillary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and 
Shelley Wright wrote a path-breaking feminist critique of international law 
and institutions in the American Journal of International Law.
1
  While 
applying feminist methodologies to international law and institutions is no 
longer a novel endeavor, serious questions remain about the extent to which 
the structures and content of international law continue to “privilege men,” 
despite the elapse of almost a quarter century.  How much international law 
has made a difference to women and girls’ rights is questionable, 
particularly when in many parts of the globe they continue to suffer from 
physical abuse at the hands of both state and non-state actors, are prevented 
from going to school, married off or trafficked as children, and used as child 
soldiers.  Progress in integrating women into international legal institutions 
is uneven at best.   
For example, the influential 34-member International Law 
Commission and 11-member Inter-American Juridical Committee contained 
only 2 female members each in June 2014.
2
 The UN human rights treaty 
bodies show ghettoization of women on the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, where women made up 22 of 23 
members, and on the Committee on the Rights of the Child, where they 
accounted for 11 of 18 members.
 3 
 Yet women made up only 10% of the 
UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances,
4
  22% of the UN Human 
Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
5
  
                                                 
1
 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, Feminist 
Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613 (1991).  
2
 Membership, available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.htm (last 
visited June 26, 2014); Members, 
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/members.asp (last visited June 26, 2014).  
3
 Membership, at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Membership.aspx 
(last visited June 26, 2014); Membership, at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/Membership.aspx (last 
visited June 26, 2014). 
4




visited June 26, 2014).  
5
 Membership, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/Membership.aspx (last 
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Only the Committee on the Rights of Persons with disabilities was 
relatively balanced; 7 out of 18 of its members were women.
6
  At a 2014 
International Council for Commercial Arbitration conference, self-reports 
by participants established that 82.4% of those serving as arbitrators were 
men, while only 17.6% were women.
7
  Only four female lawyers appeared 
before the International Court of Justice more than once between 1999 and 
2012, while 59 men appeared more than once during the same period.
8
 The 
four female lawyers accounted for only 2.9% of the speaking time during 
the fourteen year period studied.
9
   
On most international courts and tribunals, the focus of this article, 
men continue greatly to outnumber women on the bench.  International 
courts decide the scope of our human rights, what individuals should be 
held accountable for atrocity crimes, what natural resources belong to which 
states, when environmental concerns should trump trade rules and when the 
use of force is allowed.  They find facts, discern relevant rules of 
international law and apply them, filling gaps when necessary.   
International judges come from all over the world, but they do not appear to 
reflect vast swathes of the world’s people.
10  
Most international court judges 
                                                                                                                            
visited June 27, 2014); Membership, at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/Membership.aspx (last 
visited June 26, 2014). Three out of 14 of the members of the Committee on 
Migrant Workers were women. Membership, at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CMW/Pages/Membership.aspx (last 
visited June 26, 2014). Women made up 30% of the UN Committee Against 
Torture. Membership, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/Membership.aspx (last 
visited June 27, 2014). 
6
 Membership, at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Membership.aspx (last 
visited June 26, 2014). 
7
 Susan Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the ‘Invisible 
College’ of International Arbitration 17 (on file with author).   
8
 Shashank Kumar and Cecily Rose, A Study of Lawyers Appearing 





 A 2006 study found that of 215 international court judges, 63% came 
from civil law countries, 14% from common law countries, and 23% came 
from mixed common law/civil law, Islamic or local customary law blended 
with civil or common law traditions. DANIEL TERRIS, CESARE P.R. ROMANO 
& LEIGH SWIGART, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
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studied law in the top universities in their countries, while many also 
studied international law, and a large majority had graduate or doctoral 
degrees from top elite universities such as Harvard University, Columbia 
University, the University of Cambridge, the University of London, Oxford 
University, the University of Paris and the University of Moscow.
11  
Judges 
frequently have decades of experience and generally hale from three career 
paths: the national judiciary, academia or civil service in international 
organizations or for their own states as diplomats.
12 
 The percentage of 
international court judges from indigenous or poor backgrounds, minority 
groups within their own countries or having disability status appears to be 
relatively unquestioned and unknown.  
We can say with certainty, however, that a great majority of 
international courts are not representative when it comes to gender.
13
  On 
eight international courts surveyed with no representativeness requirements 
built into their selection procedures, only 15% of judges were women in 
mid-2015.
14
  On the five courts with either aspirational representativeness 
language or mandatory targets, 33% were women, however.
15
  Since 1998, 
an average of 13% of judges on international courts without 
representativeness requirements have been women, while, on average, 31% 
of judges on courts with such mandates or aspirations were women.
16
  
Courts without representativeness requirements include the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (one woman on a seven member bench), the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (one woman on a 21-member 
                                                                                                                            
MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES 17 (2007). 
11
 Id. at 17-18.  
12
 Id. at 20. The study found that 40% came from academia, 33% were 
professional national judges, and about 28% were either national or 
international civil servants. Id. See also Erik Voeten, The Politics of 
International Judicial Appointments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 387, 390 (2008).  
13
 See Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter 
to the Legitimacy of International Courts?, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 647, 654 
(2012) [hereinafter Grossman I]; see Part I, infra.  
14
 See Part I, infra.  
15
 These courts include the European Court of Human Rights, the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the International Criminal 
Court, and only ad litem judges for the International Criminal Tribunals for 
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
16
 These percentages were obtained by adding up the total number of 
slots in which women judges served every year since the courts were 
established and dividing it by the total number of slots in which both male 
and female judges served every year since establishment.  
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bench), and the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body (one woman 
on a 7-member bench).    
These statistics establish that Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright’s 
critique of international institutions remains relevant for most international 
courts.  While some may take for granted that sex representativeness on the 
bench, or generally approximating the ratio of the sexes in the general 
population, is worth aspiring to for a number of reasons, others appear 
skeptical about its importance.  A prominent commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court described the requirement for 
“fair representation” on the bench as a “gesture in the direction of political 
correctness.”
17
 There are on-going debates on whether a representativeness 
requirement should be applied to investment panels in the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership,
18
 and whether commissioner and judicial 
diversity matters for the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human 
Rights.
19
  Judges and individuals involved in judicial selection on the 
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court have 
expressed mixed views about the importance of sex representation 
requirements.
20
 While the requirements for legal, linguistic and 
geographical diversity are widely accepted, “attitudes towards gender 
balance are generally much more ambivalent.”
21
 
Yet the paucity of women judges on most international court 
benches is worrisome for a number of reasons.  First, it affects both the 
normative and sociological legitimacy of international courts.
 22
  Scholars of 
normative legitimacy ask what characteristics ought to be present for a 
court’s authority to be justified, while students of sociological legitimacy 
focus on what drives perceptions of justified authority.
23
  Legitimacy rests 
                                                 
17
 John R.W.D. Jones, Composition of the Court, in ANTONIO CASSESE, 
PAOLO GAETA AND JOHN R.W.D. JONES (eds.), THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 255 (2002). 
18
 Email discussion on OGEMID listserv (July 1-2, 2014) (on file with 
author).  
19
 CEJIL, Proceso de selección de integrantes de la comisión y la corte 
inter-americana de derechos humanos: reflexiones hacia una reforma 
(2014).  
20
 RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: 
PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 1 (2010) [hereinafter SELECTING 
INTERNATIONAL JUDGES]. 
21
 Id. at 48-49.  
22
 See Grossman I, supra note 13, at 652.    
23
 Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A 
Coming Challenge for 
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in part on the impartiality of a court.
24
  If men and women approach judging 
differently, whether based on nature or nurture, a homogeneous bench is 
inherently biased.  Few studies of the gender effect of judging on 
international courts exist, due in part to the paucity of women on the 
bench.
25
  But one study showed that women judges are much more likely to 
rule in favor of jurisdiction in International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes ICSID cases than men.
26
  Another established that 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia panels with 
female judges imposed more severe sanctions on defendants who assaulted 
females, while men imposed more severe sanctions on defendants who 
assaulted men.
27
  Judge Navanethem Pillay, the only woman on a panel 
hearing Jean Paul Akayesu’s case before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, is credited with vigorously questioning witnesses 
about sexual violence, ultimately resulting in the first conviction of an 
individual for the crime against humanity of rape and of genocide founded 
on rape.
28
  And several renowned female international court judges have 
                                                                                                                            
International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 601 (1999); 
Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 107, 116 (2009) [hereinafter Grossman II].  
24
 See BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY 17-18 (1995); see also 
David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the 
Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, Working Paper No. 1154117, 
*13 (Georgetown University Law Center, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1154177; TOM R. 
TYLER, LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
4 (Tom R. Tyler, ed. 2007); Grossman II,  supra note 23, at 129.   
25
 See Kimi L. King & Megan Greening, Gender Justice of Just 
Gender? The Role of Gender in Sexual Assault Decisions at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 
1049, 1050 n. 2 (2007) (examining the relationship between sentence length 
and sex of the judge and victim, but not including the ICTR because “there 
are too few [women judges] to conduct empirical analysis and virtually all 
the guilty defendants received life sentences.”).   
26
 Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political?, ASIL 
Research Forum *35 (UCLA Nov. 5, 2011), online at 
http://www.asil.org/midyearmeeting/pdfs/papers/November_5_2pm/Are%2
0Arbitrators%20Political.pdf (visited Nov. 18, 2011).  
27
 King & Greening, supra note 25, at 1049-1050, 1065-66.  
28
 Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 277, 282 (2002); see also Navanethem Pillay, Equal Justice 
for Women: A Personal Journey,  50 ARIZ. L. REV. 657, 665-66 (2008); 
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made the point that women bring a different set of life experiences to the 
bench than men do.
29
   
Even if men and women do not think differently, if they can 
overcome their differences, or if there is no essence unique to women as a 
group or men as a group in the first place, sex unrepresentativeness can still 
harm perceptions of legitimacy.  For example, non-governmental 
organizations and some states argued for including women on the benches 
of post-WWII international criminal tribunals because they believed women 
might make a difference in the prosecution of international crimes against 
women.
30
  Constituencies, especially those traditionally excluded from 
power, may continue to believe unrepresentative courts are biased against 
them.  South Africa could not have countenanced an all-white all-male 
judiciary, even if all the judges were “cured” of racism and sexism the day 
after Apartheid ended. In light of Third World critiques of international law 
and institutions, it is not surprising that the drafters of the World Trade 
Organization’s Dispute Settlement Understanding chose to give developing 
states the right to demand adjudicators from developing countries on 
dispute settlement panels hearing cases involving both developing and 
developed states.
31
  The exclusion of women from international law-making 
institutions historically has raised similar concerns among feminist 
                                                                                                                            
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4, paras. 696, 731 
(ICTR, Sept. 2, 1988); José E. Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu 
Judgment, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 359 ,362-63 (1999).  
29
 See e.g., Patricia Wald, Six Not-So-Easy Pieces: One Woman’s 
Journey to the Bench and Beyond, 36 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 979, 989 (2005); 
Patricia Wald, What Do Women Want from International Criminal Justice? 
To Help Shape the Law (Intlawgrrls Oct. 5, 2009)), online at 
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com2009/10/what-do-women-want-from-
international-law.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2011); TERRIS, ET AL., supra 
note 10, 48, 186-87 (containing comments by former ICC Judge 
Navanethem Pillay and former Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Judge Cecilia Medina Quiroga).   
30
 See Grossman I, supra note 13, at 661-64.  
31
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, art. 8(10), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1232 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement 
Understanding] (“when a dispute is between a developing country Member 
and a developed country Member the panel shall, if the developing country 
Member so requests, include at least one panelist from a developing country 
Member”).  
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scholars.
32
       
Democratic legitimacy provides another compelling reason for sex 
representation on international courts: those affected should be represented 
among decision-makers.   International courts exercise public authority by 
interpreting and shaping international law. “The de facto lawmaking role 
played by international judges cannot be denied.”
33
  This authority requires 
justification, and democratic values such as representation provide a 
meaningful justification.
34
   Both women and men are the beneficiaries of 
the work of international courts and should be involved in judicial decision-
making for these institutions to possess justified authority.   
There are, of course, other justifications beyond legitimacy, for 
seeking sex representation on the bench. The presence of members of 
previously excluded groups in positions of influence may create mentorship 
opportunities and role models for others; it may give previously excluded 
groups the sense that they too can succeed.  One study found that more 
female members of parliament correlates with more discussion of politics 
by both adolescent and adult women, increased participation in politics by 
adult women, and a greater intention to participate in politics among 
adolescent girls.
35
 The same phenomenon may exist in other environments.  
                                                 
32
 See HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, BOUNDARIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 308 (2000).  
33
 TERRIS ET AL., supra note 10, at 115–17 (discussing a number of 
different examples, ranging from the European and Inter-American human 
rights courts’ contribution to the development of human rights law “far 
beyond what the original drafters [of the respective conventions] might 
have conceived,” to the role of the European Court of Justice in European 
integration, to the WTO Appellate Body’s inclusion of other areas of 
international law within its jurisdiction); see also Armin von Bogdandy & 
Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as 
Lawmakers, 12 GERMAN L. J. 979, 979 (2011) (stating that international 
judicial decisions influence future decisions); Nienke Grossman, The 
Normative Legitimacy of International Courts, 86 TEMPLE L. REV. 61, 68-
76 (2013) [hereinafter Grossman III] (explaining how international courts 
influence the development of law and politics). 
34
 Gráinne De Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 226–27 (2008).  Armin von Bogdandy and 
Ingo Venzke, On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial 
Lawmaking, 12 GER. L. J. 1341, 1343 (2011).   
35
 Christina Wolbrecht & David E. Campbell, Leading by Example: 
Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models, 51 AM. J. POLI. 
SCI. 921-39 (2007); see also, e.g., Kijana Crawford & Danielle Smith, The 
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And having diverse judges can have ripple effects on homogenous counsel 
as well.  For example, appearing with an all-male team of lawyers before a 
Court with several women judges, some of whom may have called for 
greater diversity in the bar, may be ill-advised.  
Further, states are under an international legal obligation to grant 
men and women equal access to employment on international court 
benches.  The United Nations Charter specifies the United Nations, “shall 
place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in 
any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary 
organs.”
36
 Courts affiliated with the United Nations in some way or another 
include the International Court of Justice (primary judicial organ), the 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (created by Security 
Council Resolutions), and the International Criminal Court (through referral 
and deferral by the Security Council), among others.  In addition, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights indicates that States 
Parties “undertake to ensure the equal rights of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant,” 
including the right and opportunity to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs and to have access “on general terms of equality” to public service.
37
   
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women provides further evidence of state’s obligation to take steps to 
ensure the participation of women at all levels of governance. States Parties 
are obligated to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the political and public life of the country and, in 
particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right… to 
participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation 
hereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels 
of government.”
 38
  International courts fall within the scope of the 
                                                                                                                            
We and the US: Mentoring African American Women, 36 J. BLACK STUDS. 
52 (2005) (referring to the importance of mentoring to the career 
development of African American female administrators in higher 
education).   
36
 United Nations Charter, art. 8. The Preamble “reaffirm[s] faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in 
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”   
37
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 3, 25, 
adopted  Dec. 19, 1966, art. 3, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
38
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women art. 7, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter 
CEDAW].  
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obligation to ensure participation of women.
39
   
The absence or paucity of a significant proportion of the world’s 
population from most international court benches suggests that something is 
awry.   Why are women found in such meager numbers on most 
international court benches? Is a smaller pool of qualified women than men 
the reason? Who is selected for these positions, who is not, and why not?  
What does the paucity of women tell us about what values are driving the 
process of judicial selection on most international courts, and whether and 
how it may be flawed? Is outright discrimination against women the cause? 
Does a glass ceiling remain to be shattered in the international judiciary? 
Almost a quarter-century after Chinkin, Charlesworth and Wright wrote 
their seminal article, these questions deserve renewed attention and debate.   
This is the first full-length journal article to attempt to tackle these 
questions.
40
   It examines the relationship between selection procedures and 
sex representation on various international court benches. In so doing, it 
takes into account both quantitative and qualitative data on twelve different 
international courts, and it adopts a comparative approach to studying 
international courts.  Although each of these courts operates within its own 
specific institutional and legal contexts, comparing their procedures and 
outcomes can result in insights into best and worst practices and what steps 
can be taken to strengthen these increasingly important institutions.  The 
article exposes troubling qualities of selection procedures, which, if 
                                                 
39
 The CEDAW Committee subsequently clarified that obligations 
extend “to all areas of public and political life” and are not limited to those 
spelled out in article 7. “It refers to the exercise of political power, in 
particular the exercise of legislative, judicial, executive and administrative 
powers.  The term covers all aspects of public administration and the 
formulation and implementation of policy at the international, national, 
regional and local levels.” U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 23: Political 
and Public Life, 16
th
 Sess. 1997, at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm
#recom22.  CEDAW’s article 8 states that “States Parties shall take all 
appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal terms with men and 
without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their Governments 
at the international level and to participate in the work of international 
organizations.” CEDAW, supra note 38, art. 8.   
40
 But see, e.g., Jan Linehan, Women and Public International Litigation 
(Project on International Courts and Tribunals 2002), availabe at 
http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/PICT_articles/ Women1.pdf (last 
visited January 19, 2015) (providing a brief introduction to the topic).  
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remedied, may provide greater opportunities to others traditionally excluded 
from international court judgeships, as well as enhance the legitimacy 
credentials of these institutions.   At the same time, it shows that trade-offs 
may exist between inclusion of women and other less traditional candidates, 
and states’ desires to exert a high degree of control over international 
judicial selection procedures.    
Part I provides statistics on sex representativeness on twelve global 
and regional international courts and establishes that women continue to 
serve on the vast majority of these institutions in paltry numbers.  Part II 
seeks to explain whether and why glass ceilings continue to exist on most 
international courts.  It argues that although women may make up a smaller 
percentage of elite lawyers, high level legal academics and diplomats than 
men, a smaller pool is an unsatisfying explanation for a number of reasons.  
Second, national nominations tend to be opaque and known only to a small 
group of insiders, making it difficult for potential candidates to be aware of 
and apply for positions at the national level. Third, where courts employ 
institutional screening mechanisms which interview, evaluate or rank 
candidates at the international level, women appear in greater numbers.  
Fourth, women tend to be present in higher numbers where constitutive 
instruments require or aspire to the inclusion of both male and female 
judges, as compared to when no such language is present.    
Achieving sex representativeness requires the consideration and 
eventual implementation of reforms to judicial selection procedures. Part III 
proposes a number of possibilities for opening nomination procedures at the 
national level, including requiring states to publicize their procedures at the 
national level and the use of nominating commissions at the national or 
international levels.  Ultimately, it argues that if measures aimed at opening 
and making more transparent selection procedures fail to make the bench 
more representative or if states reject them, states should consider 
aspirational language for the inclusion of both male and female judges, as 
well as temporary mandatory quotas to enhance sex representation on the 
bench.    
 
I. HOW BALANCED ARE INTERNATIONAL COURT BENCHES?  
 
Table 1 shows the percentage of women judges serving on twelve 
different international courts in mid-2015.  These courts span a wide array 
of subject matters, from human rights to the Law of the Sea to international 
economic law to international criminal law, as well as many of the regions 
of the world.  They include the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, the Andean Tribunal of Justice, the European Court of Human 
Rights, the European Court of Justice, the Court for the Economic 
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Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, the International Criminal Court, the International Court 
of Justice, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former 
Yugoslavia, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the 
World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body.  The data are drawn from 
court websites or other relevant publications in mid-2015.
41
 Ad hoc 
                                                 
41
 Current Judges, European Court of Justice, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/ (last visited June 1, 2015); 
Former Judges, European Court of Justice, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_9606/#CJE (last visited June 1, 2015); 
Judges of the Court, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
available at http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/about-the-
court/jurisdiction-3/judges (last visited June 1, 2015); Email from Ana Rita 
Ramirez of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to author, 
concerning current and former judges (16 February 2015) (on file with 
author); Zaffaroni elected to inter-American rights court, Buenos Aires 
Herald.com, June 17, 2015, available at 
http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/191791/zaffaroni-elected-to-
interamerican-rights-court (last visited June 26, 2015); ECOWAS Court 
Holds Valedictory Court Session for Six Retiring Judges, ECOWAS Press 
Release (June 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=223:valedictorycourtsessionforsixretiringjudges&catid=14:pr
essrelease&Itemid=36 (last visited June 26, 2015); The Past Members of the 
Court, ECOWAS (last visited June 26, 2015), available at 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=29&Itemid=32 (last visited June 26, 2015); The Judges of the 
Community Court of Justice, ECOWAS, available at 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=260&Itemid=31http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=260&Itemid=31 (last visited 
June 26, 2015); Current Judges – Biographical Notes, International 
Criminal Court, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/the%20jud
ges/Pages/judges.aspx (last visited June 25, 2015); Former Judges, 
International Criminal Court, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/the%20ju
dges/pages/former%20judges.aspx (last visited June 25, 2015); Judges 
Continuing in Office to Complete Proceedings, International Criminal 
Court, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/the%20jud
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investment or trade arbitral panels, such as those arising under the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes or the World 
Trade Organization are not included.
42





                                                                                                                            
ges/Pages/judges%20continuing%20in%20office%20to%20complete%20pr
oceedings.aspx (last visited June 25, 2015); Judges of the Court since 1959, 
European Court of Human Rights, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/List_judges_since_1959_ENG.pdf (last 
visited April 30, 2015); Appellate Body Members, World Trade 
Organization, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm 
(last visited June 25, 2015); All Members, International Court of Justice, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=2 
(last visited June 25, 2015);  Libro Testimonio Comunitario, Tribunal 
Andino de Justicia (2004), available at 
http://www.tribunalandino.org.ec/sitetjca/index.php?option=com_filecabine
t&view=files&id=7&Itemid=35 (last visited June 26, 2015); Emails from 
Angie Sasaki of Andean Tribunal of Justice to author (Dec. 5, 2014, April 
16, 2015, May 5, 2015) (on file with author);  Members, International 
Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, available at https://www.itlos.org/the-
tribunal/members/ (last visited June 25, 2015); Members of the Tribunal 
since 1996, International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, available at 
https://www.itlos.org/en/the-tribunal/members-of-the-tribunal-since-1996/   
(last visited June 28, 2015); Annual Reports of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda to the General Assembly and Security Council, 1996-
2014; Chambers, United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, available at http://www.unictr.org/en/tribunal/chambers  (last 
visited June 1, 2015); The Judges, ICTY, available at 
http://www.icty.org/sid/151 (last visited June 1, 2015); Former Judges, 
ICTY, available at http://www.icty.org/sid/10572 (last visited June 1, 
2015). When one judge completed his or her tenure during the same year as 
another was elected, only the judge elected that year was counted for that 
year.   
42
 In 2009, only 9% of ICSID arbitrators were women and 17% of WTO 
panel members were women. See Grossman I, supra note 13, at 680.  In 
2007, Susan Franck found that only 3.5% of investment treaty arbitrators 
were women. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N. C. L. REV. 1, 81 (2007). 
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Table 1. Percentage Women Judges on Courts in Mid-2015 
 
Court Af. Ct. HPR ATJ ECHR ECJ ECOWAS IACHR 
% Women 
(mid 2015) 






























Court ICC ICJ ICTR ICTY ITLOS  WTO-AB 
% Women  
(mid 2015) 
7/18 = 39% 3/15 = 20% Permanent 
2/9 = 22% 
 
Ad Litem 
0/1 = 0% 
 
Total 
2/10 = 20% 
Permanent 
2/19 = 11% 
 
Ad Litem 
1/3 = 33% 
 
Total 
3/22 = 14% 




















Table 1 demonstrates that the smallest court in the group, the Andean 
Tribunal of Justice, was also the court with the highest percentage of 
women judges in mid-2015.  Two of the four judges, or 50%, were women. 
The next highest percentage of women served on the International Criminal 
Court, with 39% percent women judges, or 7 female out of 18 total judges, 
and then the European Court of Human Rights, where women made up 33% 
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of the 45 judges on the court. On the nine remaining courts, men made up 
80% or more of the total number of judges on the bench.  
 Table 1 also lists the countries of origin of women judges.  
Interestingly, the vast majority of the women on the global, rather than 
regional, courts came from outside of Western Europe and the United 
States.  The women on the International Criminal Court were from Japan, 
Kenya, Botswana, Dominican Republic, Belgium, Argentina and Brazil. 
Only one of seven women on the ICC came from Western Europe.  The 
women on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Appellate Chamber 
were from Pakistan and Madagascar.  The lone women on the World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement Body’s Appellate Body and on the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea were Chinese and 
Argentinian, respectively.  One of the three women on the ICJ, Joan 
Donoghue, haled from the United States, while the other two female judges 
were Chinese and Ugandan.  While not all states are parties to all of the 
global courts,
43
 a significant number of Western European and North 
American states are parties to or participate in most of them.   
 Figures 1 through 12 show the percentage of women judges serving 
on these same twelve courts from their establishment through mid-2015.  
While on some courts, a discernable upwards trend exists in the percentage 
of women judges, on others the number of women appears to have stayed 
constant or relatively, or decreased.  The data suggest that the percentage of 
women judges has generally increased over time on the Andean Tribunal of 
Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the International Court of 
Justice.  On the other hand, the number of women has remained constant on 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and relatively constant on 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, since Elsa Kelly became 
the only woman to have served on the bench in 2011.  The percentage of 
woman serving on the bench today is lower than in previous years on the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ECOWAS, the ICTY and ICTR for 
both permanent and ad litem judges, the International Criminal Court, the 
WTO Appellate Body, the European Court of Human Rights, and the 
European Court of Justice.   
 
                                                 
43
 The ICTY and the ICTR were created by Security Council 
resolutions, and therefore no state is formally a “party.” S.C. Res. 827, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (ICTY) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; S.C. 
Res, 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (ICTR) [hereinafter ICTR 
Statute].   
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Figure 2. Andean Tribunal of Justice 
Female %





























































































































































































Figure 4. European Court of Justice 































































































































































Figure 6. Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Female %






























































































Figure 8. International Court of Justice 
Female %




























































































Figure 9. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 





































































































Figure 10. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia 
% Female Permanent % Female Ad Litem




Figure 13 compares the percentage of women judges each year on 
all courts with representation requirements, either in the form of mandatory 
or virtually mandatory quotas – the ICC and the ECHR since 2004 – or 
aspirational language favoring balanced representation of the sexes – the 
ECHR from the late 1990s until 2003, the ICTY and ICTR with respect to 
ad litem judges only, and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
The ECHR is included in the group of courts with representation 
requirements since establishment, even though its emphasis on balanced 
representation began only in the late 1990s. While the percentage of women 
judges has increased over time for both categories of courts, the overall 
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Figure 12. World Trade Organization Appellate Body   
Female %
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requirement has never broken 20%.  It has reached 40% for courts with 





Figure 14 contains the percentage of slots allocated to women on 
each of the twelve courts since their establishment.  The percentage was 
calculated by dividing the total number of women judges each year by the 
total number of male and female judges per year.  The ICC is the Court that 
has had the most slots allocated to women since its establishment (47%), 
followed by ad litem judges on the ICTY (41%), and then ECOWAS 
(40%). Women served in the lowest percentages on ITLOS (2%), the ICJ 







































































































Figure 13. Percentage Female Judges - All Surveyed Courts 
Courts with Representation Requirement
Courts without Representation Requirement
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II. WHY SO FEW WOMEN?  
 Why are women under-represented and men over-represented on 
most international courts in comparison to their numbers in the world’s 
population?
44
  While a smaller pool of candidates appears to help explain 
the statistics to some extent, the argument lacks persuasive force when 
analyzed in light of the data on women’s participation on international 
courts.  A comparison of national nomination procedures and selection 
procedures at the international level suggests that courts with more open 
nomination procedures and institutional screening mechanisms may put 
more women on the bench.  In addition, courts with mandatory or near 
mandatory sex representation requirements are more likely to have higher 
percentages of women on the bench.  Finally, a lack of political will may 
account to some degree for the paucity of women on most international 
court benches, presenting a substantial hurdle to diversification of the 
international judiciary.   
A. The Limited Pool     
                                                 
44
 A United Nations Study estimated that in 2010, there were 101.6 
males per 100 females in the world.  United Nations, Population Division, 
Statistics, available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-
Data/population.htm (last visited May 26, 2014). 






ICTR - ad litem
ICTY - ad litem
Average
Figure 14. Percentage Slots Allocated to Women Since Court's 
Establishment 
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One possible explanation for the paucity of women judges on 
international courts is that they make up a much smaller percentage of the 
available pool of candidates than men do.  Judges are usually selected from 
legal academia, the judiciary and the diplomatic corps in each country.
45
  
Women are typically found in lower numbers than men in the legal 
profession generally, and in the highest echelons of the profession in most if 
not all countries. In many states, women make up a smaller proportion of 
lawyers.  An exceptional example is Saudi Arabia, which only recently 
allowed women to become lawyers.
46
  According to a recent study by Ethan 
Michelson, 36% of all countries have fewer than 30% female lawyers, and 
36% of the world’s lawyers are women.
47
   
 
   
 While the number of women lawyers is high in some states, 
numbers alone do not paint an accurate picture of women’s status in the 
legal profession globally or in each state.  Women are frequently 
underrepresented at the highest levels of the profession.  For example, while 
Michelson’s study estimated that 48% of lawyers in the UK are female, 
women accounted for 35% of practicing barristers and 11% of Queen’s 
Counsel in 2010.
48
  A similar dynamic exists in the South African courts.
49
  
In 2003, nearly 60% of law schools in the UK had never had a female 
professor and 83% of all law professors were men.
50
  A 2003 book 
examining women in the legal profession from a comparative perspective 
                                                 
45
 TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 10, at 20.   
46
 Neil MacFarquhar, Saudi Monarch Grants Women Right to Vote, 




 Ethan Michelson, Women in the Legal Profession, 1970-2010: A 
Study of the Global Supply of Lawyers, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
1071, 1089, Table A6, 35 (2013). A sampling of estimates of the percentage 
of female lawyers is drawn from the study: 32% (USA), 5% (India), 66% 
(Brazil), 35% (Mexico), 21% (China), 48% (UK), 45% (Russia), 27% 
(Indonesia), 26% (Egypt), 50% (France), 16% (Japan).  Id. 
48
 About the Bar: Statistics, The Bar Council, 
http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/about-the-bar/facts-and-
figures/statistics/#AllBarStats, (last visited March 23, 2014). 
49
 Ruth B. Cowan, Women’s Representation on the Courts in the 
Republic of South Africa, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 
291, s. C (2006).   
50
 Celia Wells, The Remains of the Day: The Women Law Professors 
Project, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS 227(Ulrike 
Schultz & Gisela Shaw, eds., 2003). 
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found that women were underrepresented in the most lucrative sectors and 
highest echelons of the legal profession in most countries surveyed, 
including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, UK, Israel, Germany, Holland, 
Poland, France and Japan.
51




Although lower levels of the judiciary in many countries are 
increasingly feminized, men continue to be overrepresented in most 
countries, especially at intermediate and highest court levels.
53
  In 2010, 
women generally made up 0%, 8%, 18%, 25%, 33%, and 35% of the higher 
courts of Paraguay, Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and Costa Rica’s 
                                                 
51
 Fiona M. Kay & Joan Brockman, Barriers to Gender Equality in the 
Canadian Legal Establishment, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 60; Rosemary Hunter, Women in the Legal 
Profession: The Australian Profile, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 89; Georgina Murray, New Zealand Women 
Lawyers at the End of the Twentieth Century, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S 
LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 128-29; Clare M.S. McGlynn, The 
Status of Women Lawyers in the United Kingdom, in WOMEN IN THE 
WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 139; see Bryna Bogoch, 
Gender, Trials and Professional Performance in Israel, in WOMEN IN THE 
WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 251 (While “occupational 
segregation” exists in Israel, women “have reached the peak of the 
profession in the public sphere.”);  Ulrike Schultz, The Status of Women 
Lawyers in Germany, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS, 
supra n. 50, at 285, 278-9 (pointing out that less than 6% of law professors 
in Germany were women in 2003); Leny E. de Groot- van Leuwen, Women 
in the Dutch Legal Profession (1950-2000), in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S 
LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 343, 354; Malgorzata Fuszara, Women 
Lawyers in Poland under Impact of Post-1989 Transformation, in WOMEN 
IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 375-6, 383; see also 
Anne Boigeol, Male Strategies in the Face of the Feminisation of a 
Profession, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 
405, 412-13; Yuriko Kaminaga & Jorn Westhoff, Women Lawyers in 
Japan: Contradictory Factors in Status, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 480-1. 
52
 See, e.g., Steven A. Boutcher & Carole Silver, Gender and Global 
Lawyering: Where are the Women?, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 8, 
(2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258221. 
53
 See, e.g., Maritza Formisano & Valentine M. Moghadam, Women in 
the Judiciary in Latin America: An Overview of Progress and Gaps, 
UNESCO (2005), 4, 20 (discussing Latin America). 
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higher courts, respectively.
54
  Similarly, while women are present in high 
numbers at the lowest levels of the judiciary in the Netherlands, France, 
Spain and Italy, it takes them longer to be promoted and they are present in 
low numbers at the highest levels of the judicial hierarchy.
55
  According to 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in 
2012, 49.2% of professional judges in OECD countries were women, but 
only 29.4% of court presidents and 26% of Supreme Court justices were 
women.
56
  In April 2011, according to the UN Progress of the World’s 
Women 2011-2012 Report, women made up 67% of the judges on the 
highest courts of Serbia and 50% in Rwanda, but no women judges were 
present on the highest courts of Andorra, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Hungary, 
Malaysia, Pakistan and Peru.
57
   Overall, for 65 of 78 states surveyed for the 
UN report, women made up 33% or less of the bench.
 58
   
Studies have identified numerous causes for the lower percentage of 
female lawyers at the highest levels of the legal profession at the domestic 
level, including the inflexible structure of specific work environments such 
as large private law firms, shouldering a disproportionate burden of 
domestic responsibilities, opting out to care for family due to family-
unfriendly policies, preferring increased flexibility and discrimination.
 59
  
To the extent that glass ceilings or discrimination keep women at lower 
levels of the judiciary in the domestic context, the available pool will look 
smaller than it is.    
The extent to which women are present (or absent) at the bars of 
international courts may also have an impact on the diversity of the bench. 
                                                 
54
 Sital Kalantry, Women in Robes, AMERICA’S Q. 83, 84 Table I 
(Summer 2012) (citing Economic Commission for Latin America statistics 
from 1998-2010), http://www.lwv.org/files/Women%20in%20Robes-
Sital%20Kalantry.pdf (last visited May 22, 2014).  
55
 Justice Susan Glazebrook, Talk delivered to Chapman-Tripp Women 
and Law Event, Looking through the Glass: Gender Inequality at the Senior 
Levels of New Zealand’s Legal Profession 3 (2010).  
56
 OECD, Gender Equality, Women in Government, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/gender/data/womeningovernment.htm (last visited 
June 25, 2015).  
57
 UN Women, 2011- 2012 Progress of the World’s Women Figure 2.6 




 See, e.g., generally, Leah V. Durant, Gender Bias and the Legal 
Profession: A Discussion of Why There Are Still So Few Women on the 
Bench, 4 MARGINS: MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 181 
(2004);  Boutcher & Silver, supra note [[]], at 9.  
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For example, women are present in meager numbers as oral advocates at the 
International Court of Justice.  In the 33 contentious cases argued in the ICJ 
between 1999 and 2012, women made up only 11% of lawyers arguing 
before the Court, and their arguments made up only 7.44% of the total 
speaking time.
60
 Only four female lawyers appeared before the ICJ more 
than once in the entire 13 year period, while 59 men appeared more than 
once during the same period, and these four female lawyers accounted for 
only 2.9% of the speaking time.
61
 There are calls for increased diversity 
among counsel before the International Criminal Court as well.
62
  Even if 
the career path of an international judge does not necessarily include 
serving as a litigator before it, the lack of diversity on the bench and at the 
bar may contribute to a culture of complacency.  It is normal to see few 
women in these contexts.  The lack or paucity of women may make the 
problem itself invisible or appear inevitable.
63
   
It is difficult to quantify the pool of women available from the 
diplomatic corps due to a lack of systematic comparative data. Nonetheless, 
in many OECD countries, women tend to be found in higher numbers in the 
public sector than in the private sector; they made up 57% of public sector 
employees in OECD countries in 2010. 
64
 Women held 40% of middle 
management positions and 29% of top management positions in 
government in 2010.
65
  According to United Nations statistics, women 
made up an average of 29% of legislators, senior officials, and managers in 
the world.
66
 Yet, in 2012, only 11 out of 115 European Union Ambassadors 
                                                 
60
 Kumar & Rose, supra note 8, at 904.   
61
 Id.     
62
 ICC-ASP/12/Res.8, § 33 (27 Nov. 2013), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-Res8-ENG.pdf. 
63
 See Cowan, supra note 49, at s. D (explaining that women judges in 
South Africa stress the need for greater visibility of women on the South 
African bench, “so that women in judicial robes can become part of the 
cultural consciousness…”). 
64
 OECD, Gender Equality, Women in Government, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/gender/data/womeningovernment.htm (last visited 
June 25, 2015).  
65
 Id.  
66
 See Statistics and Indicators on Women and Men, Women’s Share of 
Legislators, Senior Officials and Managers, United Nations Statistics 
Division, available at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/indwm/default.htm (last 
visited June 25, 2015).  




The limited pool argument lacks persuasive force for a number of 
reasons. First, in a world where women serve as presidents, ambassadors, 
judges, and professors, it is difficult to believe that only one woman in 
North, South or Central America or the Caribbean is qualified to sit on the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, only one woman in the Economic 
Community of West Africa can meet the requirements of its court, and that 
only one woman in a world of over 7 billion people is qualified to sit on the 
Law of the Sea Tribunal or the World Trade Organization’s Appellate 
Body.  In other words, a very small pool is still sufficient to fill a handful of 
open seats on international courts.  Second, the limited pool argument is 
unconvincing where women are present in higher numbers for a period and 
then drop off substantially. The ECOWAS Court, the WTO Appellate 
Body, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had three women on 
their seven-member benches just a few years ago, but they only had one 
each by mid-2015. The percentage of women judges has also dropped 
dramatically over time on both the ICTY and the ICTR.   It is reasonable to 
assume that the female pool of qualified candidates would grow over time, 
not shrink.   
In addition, the limited pool argument fails to explain why some 
global courts with very similar qualifications requirements and subject 
matter jurisdictions exhibit stark differences in the percentages of female 
judges.  In mid-2015, women made up 39% of judges on the ICC, but only 
11% and 22% of permanent judges on the ICTY and the ICTR.  
Presumably, ICC judges should have similar qualifications to those on the 
ICTY or ICTR, since all of them address international criminal law matters.   
In the same vein, a limited pool cannot explain why so many more women 
have served as ad litem judges on the ICTY than permanent judges, or why 
the number of women ad litem judges on the ICTR dropped from a high of 
60% in 2004 to a low of 20% in 2011.
68
   
                                                 
67
 See, e.g., Talyn Rahman-Figueroa, Celebrating the Rise of Women in Diplomacy, 
Diplomatic Courier: A Global Affairs Magazine, March 8, 2012, available at  
http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/topics/diplomacy/1374-celebrating-the-rise-of-
women-in-diplomacy (noting that only 11 female ambassadors served as Permanent 
Representatives of their states to the United Nations in 2002 and discussing the challenges 
to women in the United Kingdom’s diplomatic corps);  Ann Wright, For the Record: 
Breaking through Diplomacy’s Glass Ceiling, FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 55-56 (October 
2005), available at 
http://afsa.org/sites/default/files/flipping_book/1005/files/assets/downloads/publication.pdf 
(noting that rapid progress was made starting with the Carter Administration in promoting 
women to chief-of-mission positions and other high level appointments, and that in 2003 
only 25% of senior foreign service officers were women).  
68
 See supra Figures 9 and 10. Ad litem judges were first elected to the 
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Furthermore, the limited pool is unconvincing because it assumes 
that selection procedures aim to promote the most meritorious candidates in 
the first place.  This is far from obvious.  For example, in preparation for 
2015 elections to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Open 
Society Justice Initiative established a panel of experts to evaluate 
candidates nominated by states. The panel expressed concerns about 
whether one of the five candidates, Patricio Pazmiño Freire, would “be in a 
position to avoid conflicts of interest or to maintain the necessary 
independence and impartiality with regard to the Ecuadorian executive 
branch.”
69
 The panel noted that he was appointed to Ecuador’s 
Constitutional Court after the entire body was dissolved, which a 2013 
Inter-American Court decision determined violated due process norms by 
arbitrary termination and impeachment proceedings against the previous 
judges.
70
  He was elected to the bench nonetheless.  On the other hand, 
another judge, with a “long and deep commitment to human rights” lost his 
re-election bid.
71
 While this could arguably constitute an exceptional case, 
as discussed in more detail with reference to national nomination and 
international elections procedures, several scholars of international courts 
have argued that selection processes for international courts often have 
more to do with “political factors, rather than the individual selection 
criteria…”
72
 In the same vein, Philippe Sands and Cherie Booth wrote: “in 
many states, nominations are handed out to reward political loyalty rather 
than legal excellence.”
 73
  If so, the limited pool argument loses much of its 
purported explanatory force.   
The limited pool argument is also problematic because it appears 
that the percentage of women on the bench does not necessarily correspond 
with the percentage of women lawyers a state may have.  In other words, 
                                                                                                                            
ICTR in 2004.  There were ten ad litem judges on the bench in 2011.  After 
2011, the number of ad litem judges was reduced to 3 and then to 1, as the 
tribunal sought to complete its work. 
69
 Final Report of the Independent Panel for the Election of Inter-
American Commissioners and Judges (2 June 2015), 25-26, available at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/iachr-panel-
report-eng-20150603.pdf  (last visited June 24, 2015) [hereinafter 
Independent Panel Report].  
70
 Id. at 26.  
71
 Id. at 29.  
72
 See, e.g., SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, supra note 20, at 95; 
see infra at note 302. 
73
 Cherie Booth & Philippe Sands, Keep Politics out of the Global 
Courts, The Guardian (July 13, 2001).   
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growing the pool does not necessarily translate to more women on the 
bench.  Although Michelson estimates that 50% of France’s lawyers are 
women,
74
 no French woman has ever served as a permanent judge on the 
European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the 
International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICTR or the ICTY, 
although French men have served on all of them.  Michele Picard is the only 
French woman to have served on any of the international courts surveyed, 
as an ad litem judge on the ICTY.  In the same vein, although women 
account for about 48% of the United Kingdom’s lawyers according to 
Michelson,
75
 no British woman has ever served on the European Court of 
Justice, the International Criminal Court, the European Court of Human 
Rights, or the ICTY, although British men have.  Dame Rosalynn Higgins, 
the first woman ever to serve as a permanent judge on the International 
Court of Justice is British, however. On the other hand, China, which is 
estimated to have about 21% female lawyers,
76
 has appointed women to the 
International Court of Justice and the World Trade Organization’s Appellate 
Body; Chinese men have served on the ICJ, the ICTY and the ICTR.  
Russia has appointed no women to the European Court of Human Rights, 
the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea, the ICTR and ICTY, although Russian men have served there. 
Michelson estimates that 45% of Russia’s lawyers are women.
77
 Only 16% 
of lawyers are women in Japan,
78
 yet Japanese women have served on both 
the ICTY and the ICC.    
B. There’s an opening? The opacity of national nomination procedures 
 
 The number of women serving as international court judges in 
proportion to their availability in the pool of qualified candidates raises 
serious questions about the definition of the pool itself and what procedures 
are utilized to identify candidates for the pool.  This process generally takes 
place at the national level.  National nominations practices can be grouped 
into three categories: (1) little to no guidance or transparency, (2) a high 
level of guidance or transparency, and (3) no nominations procedure at the 
national level.  Most of the twelve courts surveyed fall into the first group, 
while the ECHR and the ECJ fall into the second, and ECOWAS into the 
third.   A comparison of these three groups’ selection procedures and 
                                                 
74








 Id.  
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statistics on women’s participation does not appear to yield concrete 
conclusions about the relationship between the amount of guidance 
provided or the degree of transparency in national nominations procedures, 
and the percentage of women judges on the bench in mid-2015 or 
historically.  What is clear, however, is that national nomination procedures 
are frequently opaque and known only to well-connected insiders.  Such 
procedures not only make it more difficult for outsiders to make it to the 
international election stage, but also, they raise questions about whether 
selection procedures aim to seat the most meritorious candidates in the first 
place.   
1. Group 1: Little Guidance or Transparency  
 
 The ICJ, ICC, AfCHPR, ICTY, ICTR, WTO, ATJ, ITLOS, and 
IACHR contain the least guidance on national selection procedures.  The 
ICJ Statute provides that a national group composed of up to four 
individuals named by states parties to the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
are charged with nominating candidates for the ICJ, and that the national 
group “is recommended to consult its highest court of justice, its legal 
faculties and schools of law, and its national academies and national 
sections of international academies devoted to the study of law.”
79
  
Interviews of individuals involved in selection, however, showed that few 
actually engage in the recommended consultation.
80
  National groups may 
nominate no more than four candidates and not more than two of them may 
be of the nationality of the national group; the number of candidates 
nominated by a group cannot be greater than double the number of seats to 
be filled.
81
  There are no separate guidelines or best practices available to 
states concerning domestic nominations procedures.  In mid-2015, women 
made up 20% of the fifteen-member bench, but women account for only 3% 
of the court’s slots since establishment.  Dame Rosalynn Higgins (United 
Kingdom) became the first woman to serve as a judge on the ICJ in 1995.  
Xue Hanquin (China) and Joan Donoghue (United States) joined the bench 
in 2010, followed by Julia Sebutinde (Uganda) in 2012.  
 The Rome Statute of the ICC specifies that any state party may 
nominate a candidate for election, and the procedure for nomination should 
be the same as for the highest judicial offices of that State or by the same 
procedure utilized for the International Court of Justice.
82
  Nominations 
                                                 
79
 Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 4-10, 26 June 1945,  
59 Stat. 1055 (1945), TS No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].  
80
 SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, supra note 20, at 142-43.  
81
 ICJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 5(2).  
82
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 36(4), 17 July 
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must include a statement describing the candidate’s competence in criminal 
law and procedure or relevant international law areas, and their language 
capabilities.
83
  Once the Secretariat receives the nominations, it must place 
them and any accompanying information on the ICC website as soon as 
possible.
84
  While the drafters of the Rome Statute and the Assembly of 
States Parties developed detailed rules concerning international elections 
procedures, discussed in the section below, the same does not appear to 
apply to national nominations.   The Assembly of State Parties has 
encouraged states “to conduct thorough and transparent processes to 
identify the best candidates,” but it has not issued guidelines as to what 
procedures would be appropriate.
85
    
 During its 10
th
 Session (2011-2012), the Assembly of State Parties 
agreed on the creation of an Advisory Committee on Nominations.
86
  
Despite its name, however, the Advisory Committee on Nominations plays 
no role whatsoever in the nomination process.  Rather, it evaluates whether 
nominees already proposed by states meet the requirements of the Rome 
Statute, and is discussed further below.
87
  Scholars of the ICC and the 
Assembly of State Parties have expressed concerns that individual state 
nomination processes lack transparency and may not be driven by merit.
88
  
                                                                                                                            




 ICC-ASP, Sixth Session, Res. ICC-ASP/3/Res.6, para. 8 (Sept. 10, 
2004) [hereinafter Procedure for nomination to ICC].   
85
 Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties, ICC-ASP12/Res.8 (Advance copy) para. 27 (Nov. 27, 2013), 
available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-Res8-ENG.pdf 
[hereinafter Strengthening the ICC]. 
86
 Res. ICC-ASP-10-Res.5-ENG, paras. 19-20 (Dec. 21, 2011).  In the 
same resolution, the Assembly of the State Parties encouraged States Parties 
“to conduct thorough and transparent processes to identify the best 
candidates” for judgeships. Id. 
87
 Report of the Bureau on the Establishment of an Advisory Committee 
on Nominations of judges of the International Criminal Court, Tenth 
Session, U.N. Doc. ICC/ASP/10/36 (Dec. 21, 2011).  
88
 Strengthening the ICC, supra note 85, para. 27  (“Emphasizes the 
importance of nominating and electing the most highly qualified judges in 
accordance with article 36 of the Rome Statute, and for this purpose 
encourages States Parties to conduct thorough and transparent processes to 
identify the best candidates;”);  SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, supra 
note 20. 
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39% of the judges on the ICC bench in mid-2015 were women. Women 
accounted for 47% of judicial slots since its establishment.   
  States parties to the constitutive instrument of the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ rights may nominate up to three candidates each for 
that court, two of whom must be nationals of that state and none of whom 
may share the nationality of any sitting member of the court.
89
  The 
Protocol establishing the Court provides that “[d]ue consideration shall be 
given to adequate gender representation in the nomination process,” but 
provides no further guidance on national nominations.
90
  Interestingly, the 
African Union Commission, in correspondence to states in advance of 
elections taking place in June 2014, asserted that it was “mandatory” that 
states propose at least one female candidate each, given the low numbers of 
women on the bench.
 91
 Also, the Commission suggested that in their 
nominations procedures, states should consider taking into account,  
 
additional factors submitted to the AU Commission by Civil Society 
organizations: a) The procedure for nomination of candidates should 
be at the minimum that for appointment to the highest judicial office 
in the State Party; b) States Parties should encourage the 
participation of civil society, including Judicial and other State 
bodies, bar associations, academic and human rights organizations 
and women’s groups, in the process of selection of nominees; c) 
State Parties should employ a transparent and impartial national 





In July 2014, one man was re-elected, and two men and one woman 
                                                 
89
 Protocol to African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights arts. 
11(2) and 12, June 10, 1998, Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) 
(entered into force Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Protocol to African Charter].   
90
 Protocol to African Charter, supra note 89, art. 12. 
91
 See Letter to Ministries of Foreign Affairs/External Relations of all 
Member States from the African Union Commission, Reference: 
BC/OLC/66.5/2954.14, available at 
http://legal.au.int/en/sites/default/files/2954.14_Bc-olc-66.5_Eng_0.pdf. 
92
 Letter to Ministries of Foreign Affairs/External Relations of all 
Member States from the African Union Commission, Reference: 
BC/OLC/66.5/2954.14, available at 
http://legal.au.int/en/sites/default/files/2954.14_Bc-olc-66.5_Eng_0.pdf. 
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were elected to replace two men and one woman.
93
 In mid-2015, women 
made up 18% of the bench, a number which has remained constant since its 
establishment. 
The Resolutions establishing the ICTY and ICTR provide almost no 
guidance on national nominations procedures.  United Nations member 
states and non-member states maintaining permanent observer missions at 
the United Nations may nominate up to two candidates for permanent and 
four candidates for ad litem judges to the International Criminal Tribunals 
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, who meet the qualifications 
requirements and are not of the same nationality as each other or as a sitting 
member of the other tribunal or the appeals chamber.
94
  While for the 
nomination of ad litem judges, states are encouraged to take “into account 
the importance of a fair representation of female and male candidates,”
95
 no 
such requirement exists for permanent judges. No other guidance is 
provided as to national nominations.  11% of the permanent judges on the 
ICTY were women, while 22% of the permanent judges on the ICTR were 
women in mid-2015.  The sole ad litem judge remaining on the ICTR was a 
man, while one of three ad litem judges on the ICTY was a woman. Women 
have served in 21% and 13% of the permanent judge slots on the ICTR and 
the ICTY, respectively, and 35% and 41% of the ad litem slots, 
respectively. 
 The constitutive instruments and rules of procedure (when relevant) 
of ITLOS, IACHR, and ATJ say nothing about suggested or required 
procedures for national nominations, beyond specifying qualifications for 
judges and nationality requirements.
96
  For example, the Statute of the Inter-
                                                 
93
 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, New Judges Appointed 
to the Court, available at http://www.african-
court.org/en/index.php/news/latest-news/545-new-judges-appointed-to-the-
court (last visited November 21, 2014).  
94
 S. C. Res. 1329, Annex I art. 13, 13bis, UN Doc S/RES/1329 (2000); 
S. C. Res. 143,1 Annex I, art. 12, 12bis, UN Doc S/RES/1431 (2002).  
Judges “shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity 
who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices. In the overall composition of the 
Chambers and sections of the Trial Chambers, due account shall be taken of 
the experience of the judges in criminal law, international law, including 
international humanitarian law and human rights law.” Id.  
95
 S. C. Res. 1329, Annex I art. 13, UN Doc S/RES/1329 (2000).  
96
 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VI, 
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 [hereinafter ITLOS 
Statute]; Rules of the Tribunal, 28 October 1997 (as amended on 15 March 
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American Court provides that judges must be “elected in an individual 
capacity from among jurists of the highest moral authority and of 
recognized competence in the field of human rights, who possess the 
qualifications required for the exercise of the highest judicial functions 
under the law of the state of which they are nationals or of the state that 
proposes them as candidates.”
97
  States may nominate up to two 
appropriately qualified candidates to the Law of the Sea Tribunal,
98
 three to 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
99
 and three to the Andean 
Tribunal of Justice.
100
 When states nominate three candidates to the Inter-
American Court, at least one must be a national of a state other than the 
nominating state.
101
  In mid-2015, women made up 5%, 14%, and 50% of 
the judges on ITLOS, IACHR, and ATJ, respectively.  Elsa Kelly of 
Argentina is the only woman ever to have served on ITLOS’s 21-member 
bench since its establishment.   For 20 of the 36 years since the IACHR’s 
founding, women were absent from the bench; most recently, no women 
served on the bench in 2013 and 2014.  2014 was the first year that two 
women served on the ATJ simultaneously since its establishment.   
 States are not required to nominate members of the WTO Appellate 
Body, but they may forward suggestions to the Director-General.
102
 The 
                                                                                                                            
and 21 September 2001, and on 17 March 2009), Doc. ITLOS/8, 17 March 
2009; Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, OAS Res. 448 
(DC-O/79), OAS Official Records OEA/Ser P/IX.0.2/80, Vol. 1, at 98 
[hereinafter IACHR Statute]; Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, 2000, available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/regal_ing.pdf. [hereinafter IACHR Rules of 
Procedure]; American Convention on Human Rights, 22 Nov. 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. 36; OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser L/V/II 23, Doc. 21, Rev. 6 (1979); 
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American HR Convention];  
Andean Subregional Integration Agreement, May 26, 1969, 8 ILM 910 
(1969); Treaty Creating the Andean Tribunal of Justice, May 28, 1979, 18 
ILM 1203 (1979) [hereinafter ATJ Treaty]. 
97
 IACHR Statute, supra note 96, art. 4. 
98
 ITLOS Statute, supra note 96, art. 4.  
99
 IACHR Statute, supra note 96, art. 6. When a slate of three is 
proposed, at least one of the candidates must be a national of a state other 
than the nominating state. Id.  
100
 ATJ Treaty, supra note 96, art. 7. 
101
 IACHR Statute, supra note 96, art. 7.  
102
 Establishment of the Appellate Body, Recommendations by the 
Preparatory Committee for the WTO, para. 13, WT/DSB/1, approved by the 
Dispute Settlement Body on February 10, 1995 (June 19, 1995) [hereinafter 
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WTO DSU offers no guidance on what procedures delegations should use 
in coming up with names to propose, even though the United States and the 
EU always nominate candidates to fill their unofficial reserved spots on the 
bench.
103
 The United States generally nominates at least two people when 
proposing individuals to fill its unofficial spot.
104
 A Selection Committee 
composed of the Director-General, the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement 
Body, and the Chairmen of the Goods, Services, TRIPS and General 
Councils then makes proposals for new members “after appropriate 
consultations.”
 105
 Critiques have been raised concerning the increasing 
politicization of the WTO AB nominating process, as well as the need to 
ensure geographic diversity on the bench.
106
  One of seven members of the 
Appellate Body was a woman in mid-2015.  Women were absent from the 
bench for the first eight years after it was established.  Between one and 
three women have served on the seven-member bench each year since then.  
2. Group 2: Greater Amount of Guidance and Transparency 
 
States appointing candidates to the ECJ have received some 
guidance in the national nomination procedure since 2009.
107
 The Treaty of 
Lisbon, which entered into force that year, added a new element to the 
judicial selection procedure consisting of an advisory panel.  Article 255 
established a panel to “give an opinion on candidates’ suitability to perform 
the duties of Judge and Advocate-General” before the governments make 
their selections.
108
  The panel, which is appointed by the Council of the 
                                                                                                                            
WTO Prep Cmte Recs]. 
103
 Ruth Mackenzie, The Selection of International Judges, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 745 (Cesare P.R. 
Romano et al., eds. 2014); Joost Pauwelyn, La sélection des juges a l’OMC, 
et peut-être celle d’un Chinois, mérite plus d’attention, Le Temps (16 Nov. 
2007). 
104
 Pauwelyn, supra note 103. 
105
 WTO Prep Cmte Recs, supra note 102, para. 13.  
106
 Pauwelyn, supra note 103; see also Manfred Elsig & Mark A. 
Pollack, Agents, Trustees, and international courts: The politics of judicial 
appointment at the World Trade Organization, 0 EURO. J. INT’L REL. 1 
(2012); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Selection Panel to Recommence Search For 
Appellate Body Judge Following Deadlock, International Trade Daily: 
News Archive (January 21, 2014). 
107
 Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 221, Nov. 10, 
1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
108
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 255, May 9, 
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) [hereinafter TFEU Treaty]. 
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European Union, is composed of seven members, including former 
members of the Court of Justice and the General Court, members of 
national supreme courts, and lawyers of recognized competence, one of 
whom must be proposed by the European Parliament.
109
  The President of 
the Court of Justice proposes six of the candidates, and the European 
Parliament proposes the seventh candidate.
110
 Panel members serve four 
year terms renewable once.
111
  State members propose judicial candidates to 
the panel, and the panel may request additional information, holds a private 
hearing with the candidate, and then prepares an opinion on the candidate’s 
suitability, including a statement of reasons.
112
  The panel then forwards its 
opinion to member state governments.
113
 There is no guidance on 
procedures to be followed by states in generating names for the panel’s 
review in the first instance.  There is no election process; rather individual 
states then appoint their nominees to the bench.    
In mid-2015 the ECJ was composed of five women and twenty-three 
men (18% women). From 1952 until 1999, no woman had ever served on 
the ECJ’s bench. From 1999 until 2008, between one and three women 
served on the bench.  It is interesting to note that the court’s membership 
increased from 15 to 27 during that period,  decreasing the percentage of 
women judges on the bench from 20% in 2003, to 11% in 2008.  Since 
2009, the number of women on the bench has fluctuated between 4 and 5, 
ranging from 15% to 18% of the total bench.  
 The European Court of Human Rights has among the most complex 
selection procedures of the world’s international courts, and the history of 
the evolution in the procedures is important to understanding its current 
iteration.  From 1959 until 1998, the process was relatively simple.  
According to the text of the original European Convention on Human 
Rights, the Consultative Assembly was to elect judges to the Court from a 
list of three candidates provided by Members of the Council of Europe.
114
  




 Id.; Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Between Idealism and Realism: A 
Few Comparative Reflections and Proposals on the Appointment Process of 
the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights Members, 
Working Paper #1, 14 (May 2014).  
111
 European Council Decision Relating to the Operating rules of the 
Panel Provided for in Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (2010/124/EU), Annex, para. 3. 
112
 Id. at paras. 6-8. 
113
 Id. at para. 8. 
114
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 39, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. 
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Candidates were to “possess high moral character and… either possess the 
qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be 
jurisconsults of recognised competence.”
115
  The Court was to be composed 
of one judge from each state member of the Council of Europe, and no two 
judges could be nationals of the same state.
116
  States included no other 
guidance for national nominations or qualifications requirements in the 
original convention.   The percentage of women judges on the bench during 
this period fluctuated between 0% and 11%; it was 3% in 1998.   
 In preparation for the entry into force of Protocol 11, the 
Parliamentary Assembly adopted resolutions, recommendations and orders 
with regard to selection procedures.  Judges are still elected from lists of 3 
candidates submitted by each state party, by the Parliamentary Assembly,
117
 
but a much greater focus exists on making national selection procedures 
transparent and ensuring the election of qualified candidates.  In 1996, the 
Parliamentary Assembly committed itself to improving its procedures for 
the selection of candidates, adopted a model curriculum vita to systematize 
the information provided by candidates to the Parliamentary Assembly, and 
it undertook to require personal interviews of candidates by one of its 
committees once candidates were nominated.
118
  It also ordered the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to “examine the question of 
the qualifications and manner of appointment of judges to the European 
Court of Human Rights, with a view to achieving a balanced representation 
of the sexes.”
119
 Between 1997 and 1998 the percentage of women on the 
bench jumped from 3% to 18%. The percentage of women judges on the 
court has not fallen below 17% since then.   
                                                                                                                            
T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter 
ECHR]. 
115
 Id., art. 39.  
116
 Id., art. 38.  
117
 Protocol 11, art. 22; European Convention on Human Rights, as 
amended by Protocols 11, 14, and supplemented by Protocols 1,4, 6, 7 ,12, 
13, at art. 22. 
118
 On the procedure for examining candidatures for the election of 
judges to the European Court of Human Rights Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, Resolution 1082 (1996). Recommendation 1295 
(1996) on the procedure for examining candidatures for the election of 
judges to the European Court of Human Rights.  
119
 Procedure for examining candidatures for the election of judges to 
the European Court of Human Rights, Order 519 (1996); see e.g., 
Resolution 1200 (1999), Election of judges to the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
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 In 1999, the Parliamentary Assembly criticized national selection 
procedures and proposed criteria for their improvement;
120
  it recommended 
that the Committee of Ministers invite states to apply the following set of 
criteria in the preparation of candidate lists:  
 
i. issue a call for candidatures through the specialised press, so as to 
obtain candidates who are indeed eminent jurists satisfying the 
criteria laid down in Article 21, paragraph 1, of the Convention; 
ii. ensure that the candidates have experience in the field of human 
rights, either as practitioners or as activists in non-governmental 
organisations working in this area; 
iii. select candidates of both sexes in every case; 
iv. ensure that the candidates are in fact fluent in either French or 
English and are capable of working in one of these two languages; 
v. put the names of the candidates in alphabetical order.
121
 
In addition, the Assembly asked the Committee of Ministers to invite 
member states to consult their national parliaments in the preparation of 
lists to create a more transparent national selection procedure.
122
 Shortly 
thereafter, it instructed the Sub-Committee on the Election of Judges of the 
Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights to ensure that states 
members apply these criteria, “and in particular the presence of candidates 
of both sexes.”
123
  In the same vein, in 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly 
emphasized the importance of an independent judiciary for the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, insisted that the appointments 
process “reflect the principles of democratic procedure, the rule of law, non-
discrimination, accountability and transparency,” and it urged states to 
publish their procedures.
124
   
                                                 
120
 Recommendation 1429(1999), National procedures for nominating 
candidates for election to the European Court of Human Rights.   
121
 Recommendation 1429(1999), National procedures for nominating 
candidates for election to the European Court of Human Rights. 
122
 Id.  
123
  Order No. 558 (1999), National procedures for nominating 
candidates for election to the European Court of Human Rights.  
124
 Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights, Recommendation 
1649 (2004). The Assembly’s Recommendation stated:  “…it is not 
satisfactory merely to assert that the gender balance of the Court reflects the 
under-representation of women in the judiciary of the member states.  It is 
in the interest of impartiality and of the Court’s effectiveness for the 
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 In Resolution 1366 (2004), the Parliamentary Assembly decided it 
would no longer consider lists of candidates where the areas of competence 
of candidates appear “unduly restricted,” the list does not contain candidates 
of both sexes, the candidates do not have sufficient knowledge of an official 
language of the Court, or do not possess “the stature” to meet the 
qualifications requirements enumerated in article 21 of the European 
Convention.
125
  The Assembly emphasized its belief in the importance of 
the transparency of procedures, and it decided to investigate obstacles to 
nominating women at the national and European levels.
126
  After Malta 
submitted an all-male list to the Parliamentary Assembly, it sought an 
Advisory Opinion from the European Court of Human Rights on the 
requirement for at least one member of the under-represented sex.  As a 
result of the Court’s opinion, the Assembly modified its list requirement 
such that it would only consider single-sex lists where a contracting party 
has “taken all necessary and appropriate steps” to obtain a list with a 
candidate of the under-represented sex.
127
  Also, it required various bodies 
of the Assembly to certify the existence of “exceptional circumstances” 
                                                                                                                            
Committee of Ministers, the Assembly, and the high contracting parties to 
address the issue of the gender imbalance of the Court by considering –and 
where necessary, improving – the procedures for the appointment of 
judges.” Id. The Parliamentary Assembly then called on the Committee of 
Ministers to invite member states to meet specific criteria before submitting 
their candidate lists, including an open call for candidates, candidates with 
experience in human rights, lists with both sexes, candidates with 
knowledge of one of the official languages of the Court, and that names of 
candidates be placed in alphabetical order on candidate lists. It also 
encouraged the Committee to consider revising the Convention to state that 
the three-candidate lists include at least one candidate of each sex.  Id., 
paras. 19, 21. 
125
 Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights, Resolution 
1366 (2004). 
126
 Id. The Parliamentary Assembly then decided to reintroduce and 
modify the rule for candidate lists such that it would no longer consider 
candidates where “the list does not include at least one candidate of each 
sex, except when the candidates belong to the sex which is under-
represented in the Court, that is the sex to which under 40% of the total 
number of judges belong.” Candidates for the European Court of Human 
Rights, Resolution 1426 (2005). 
127
 Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights, Resolution 
1627 (2008). 
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permitting a list with no members of the under-represented sex.
128
 Since the 
Advisory Opinion was issued, states have provided unisex lists on at least 
two occasions.
129
 In 2009, the Parliamentary Assembly reiterated that 
national nominations procedures must reflect principles of “democratic 
procedure, transparency and non-discrimination,” it required the Assembly 
to reject lists that fail to present a “real choice” among the candidates 
submitted, and allowed the Assembly to reject lists not generated through 
“fair, transparent and consistent” national selection procedures.
130
   
                                                 
128
 Id. In the wake of the Court’s Advisory Opinion, the Assembly 
modified the list requirement: “Lists of candidates should as a general rule 
contain at least one candidate of each sex, unless the sex of the candidates 
on the list is under-represented on the Court (under 40% of judges) or if 
exceptional circumstances exist to derogate from this rule.” CM(2012)40 
addendum final, 4.4 Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the 
selection of candidates for the post of judge at the European Court of 
Human Rights – Explanatory Memorandum.  
129
 See, e.g., List and curricula vitae of candidates submitted by the 
Government of the Republic of Moldova (Aug. 28 2012), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/2012/COE.PACE.WD.C
OM.13027.2012.EN.pdf (proposing three male candidates); Letter   to the 
Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly from the Belgian Federal 
Department 
of Justice, dated July 7, 2011, available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewPDF.asp?FileID=12986&lang=en (proposing three male candidates).  
130
 Resolution 1646 (2009), Nomination of candidates and election of 
judges to the European Court of Human Rights. The Assembly again listed 
best practices for selection procedures, such as open calls for candidates and 
listing candidates in alphabetical order, and “strongly urge[d]” states to 
establish national selection procedures “to ensure that the authority and 
credibility of the court are not put at risk by ad hoc and politicised 
processes” and such that those advising on selection are “themselves as 
gender-balanced as possible.” Id. In 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly 
specified that when a list lacks a member of the underrepresented sex, two-
thirds of the Sub-Committee on the Election of Judges to the European 
Court of Human Rights must determine that the state proposing the list took 
all “necessary and appropriate steps to ensure” that the list contained 
candidates of both sexes meeting the qualifications requirements in the 
European Convention, and the Parliamentary Assembly must also endorse 
this position. Resolution 1841 (2011),  The amendment of various 
provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly – 
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 In 2010, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
established an Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election as 
Judge to the European Court of Human Rights to assist states in evaluating 
candidates before they are transmitted to the Parliamentary Assembly for 
consideration.
131
  The Panel is composed of seven members chosen from 
states’ highest national courts, former judges of international courts, and 
lawyers of recognized competence, by the Committee of Ministers in 
consultation with the President of the Court, and the panel is supposed to be 
“geographically and gender balanced.”
132
  States must forward to the Panel 
the names and curricula vitae of intended candidates before submitting them 
to the Parliamentary Assembly.  If, following consultations with the 
nominating state, the Panel finds that a nominee is not suitable, it will 
provide that view and its reasoning confidentially to the state.  When three 
candidates are presented by a state to the Parliamentary Assembly, the 
Panel will confidentially provide its views in writing as to whether the 
candidates meet the criteria of the Convention.  The first panel consisted of 
two women and five men.
133
  In June 2014, the Committee appointed a 
Panel consisting of one woman and six men.
134
 
 In addition, in 2012, the Committee of Ministers issued detailed 
guidance on the selection of candidates for ECHR judgeships covering the 
establishment of procedures, identification of criteria for candidates, 
composition and procedures of selection bodies, and the role of the final 
decision-maker to whom selection bodies report.
135
  The Guidelines provide 
                                                                                                                            
Implementation of Resolution 1822 (2011) on the reform of the 
Parliamentary Assembly. 
131




 Establishment of the Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for 
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 Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election as Judge to the 





 CM(2012)40 addendum final, 4.4 Guidelines of the Committee of 
Ministers on the selection of candidates for the post of judge at the 
European Court of Human Rights – Explanatory Memorandum, paras. 2, 
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specific examples of best practices.  As for the procedure for drawing up 
recommended lists of candidates, the Committee noted that the composition 
of selection bodies is an “essential consideration” and it should be free from 
“undue influence since the composition of the final list of candidates must 
not be, and must not appear to be a result of political patronage or 
preference…”
136
 The committee that evaluates candidates after states 
submit them to the Parliamentary Assembly also considers whether the state 
complied with the criteria established by the Assembly, including the 
presence of the under-represented sex in the list of candidates.
137
  
  Between 1999 and 2015, the percentage of women on the bench has 
fluctuated between 17% in 1999 and 2000, and 40% in 2011, increasing 
every year from 2000 until 2011.  Since 2011, the percentages have ranged 
from 33% to 36%.  Women have taken up 29% of the judicial slots since 
1999.   
3. Group 3: No National Nomination Procedure 
 
 The ECOWAS Court has no national selection procedure at all.  The 
Protocol to the Community Court of Justice states that member states may 
nominate up to two candidates each, and then Heads of State of member 
states vote on the nominees.
138
  In 2006, States reformed the judicial 
selection procedure to give national judges a greater voice in the selection 
of judges to ECOWAS through a Community Judicial Council, composed 
of chief justices of states without representation on the Court.
139
 The reform 
was instituted, also, to “ensure that the Court is endowed with the best 
qualified and competent persons to contribute, by virtue of their quality and 
experience” to the development of Community law.
140
  When it is a state’s 
turn to have a judge sit on the Court, the Council initiates a competitive 
selection process by advertising the vacancies and required qualifications in 
the Official Gazette of the Community and widely circulated national 
                                                                                                                            
15, 16.   
136
 Id., para. 48.  
137
 Evaluation of the implementation of the reform of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, Resolution 2002 (2014), paras. 9 &10, Appendix. 
138
 Protocol A/P.1/7/91 on the Community Court of Justice art. 3, July 6, 
1991 [hereinafter 1991 Protocol]. 
139
 Karen J. Alter et al., A New International Human Rights Court for 
West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 737, 760 (2013).  
140
 ECOWAS Newsletter, 4 (October 2006), available at 
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/newsletter/ECOWAS_NewsLetter_0
1-Eng.pdf (last visited November 12, 2014).    
7-Sep-15] SHATTERING THE GLASS CEILING  45 
gazettes and newspapers.
141
 The Council collects the applications, narrows 
down the applications to three per state, interviews the three candidates per 
state, and then recommends one to the Authority.
142
  Interestingly, it 
appears that the home state of the candidate is no longer formally involved 
in the nomination process for its candidates to the Court, although 
candidates without a state’s support are unlikely to survive the Authority’s 
vote.
143
  Although, after the Court lost one of its seven judges, women made 
up 50% of the bench in 2012 and 2013, by mid-2015, only one woman was 
serving on the 7 member bench.      
4. Conclusions on National Nominations  
 
 When courts are grouped by the amount of guidance provided to 
states on national nominations procedures, no clear pattern in the data on 
sex representativeness emerges.  ECOWAS dropped from 50% to 14%, 
even though its national nomination procedure appears quite 
comprehensive, open and focused on merit.  The ICJ’s percentage of female 
judges has increased from 0% to 20%, but there has been no apparent 
corresponding change to national selection procedures.  The ICC has a 
relatively high number of female judges, but little in the way of guidance 
for national selection procedures.  The ECJ has had an advisory committee 
on nominations since 2009, but the percentage of female judges is still quite 
low.  On the other hand, the Court with the greatest amount of guidance on 
national nomination procedures, the ECHR, shows a strong upward trend in 
female participation.  Since the Parliamentary Assembly began emphasizing 
open and merit-based selection procedures, the percentage of female judges 
has increased dramatically.  
 A number of factors make conclusions difficult to draw about the 
relationship between national nomination procedures and sex 
representativeness.  First, the sample size of twelve courts is relatively 
small.  Second, to some extent, the comparison is one of apples and 
oranges.  Procedures differ across courts, and sometimes suggested or even 
required guidelines or procedures are not rigorously complied with.  Also, 
                                                 
141
 MOJEED OLUJINMI ABEFE ALABI, ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE 
ECOWAS COURT IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA 147 (Thesis 
submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of 
Leicester) (2013).  An advertisement for a judicial position was even posted 
on an internet job site: http://m.ngcareers.com/job/2013-10/judge-at-
national-judicial-council#sthash.GlX3Q2vd.sVzCrGir.dpbs  (last visited 
November 14, 2014).  
142
 Id. at 148.  
143
 Id. at 148-49.  
46 SHATTERING THE GLASS CEILING [1-Aug-15 
looking only at national nominations leaves out what happens at the 
international elections stage, when such a stage exists. Finally, it excludes 
sex representativeness requirements or aspirations found in a few courts’ 
statutes. What does emerge from the comparison, however, is that, with a 
few notable exceptions, the vast majority of the courts surveyed have 
surprisingly little concrete instruction to states at the national nomination 
stage. Nor are their procedures transparent.   
The lack of a transparent procedure for selecting judges on most 
courts makes it easier for selectors to define the pool of acceptable 
candidates narrowly and in a way that may benefit them personally.  
Individuals may select a particular nominee because it will help them gain a 
professional advantage in the future, or the nominee’s pedigree may 
correspond with the selector’s own understanding of merit, based on the 
selector’s own professional choices.  It benefits an Oxford graduate to name 
other Oxford graduates to positions of power because it enhances her own 
credentials.  It may benefit a lawyer to push his client to name a particular 
individual as ad hoc judge to the International Court of Justice in the hopes 
that the newly named judge will become a friendly professional 
acquaintance and reciprocate in some way in the future.  Bryant Garth and 
Yves Dezalay made a similar point in the context of international 
commercial arbitration:  arbitrators and would be arbitrators “promote the 
forms of symbolic capital that give maximum value to their personal 
characteristics, but also they try to build symbolic capital that will allow 
them to prosper and succeed in the changing environment.”
144
  Access to 
the kinds of experiences that build symbolic capital or prestige may itself be 
conditioned upon the same incentives to exclude newcomers or individuals 
with non-traditional backgrounds, as well as flawed selection procedures.  
For example, four of the last five judges elected to the ICJ were previously 
members of the International Law Commission,
145
 but very few women 
have ever served on that body; only 2 of 34 members elected in 2011 were 
women.
146
   
 Further, opaque nomination procedures are likely to make it more 
difficult for less well connected potential candidates to be aware of 
                                                 
144
 YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 10, 18 n. 7 (1996). 
145
  Dapo Akande, Patrick Robinson of Jamaica Elected to the ICJ 
(November 19, 2014), at http://www.ejiltalk.org/patrick-robinson-of-
jamaica-elected-to-the-icj/. 
146
 Membership, International Law Commission (2012-2016), at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
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openings.  In a recent book, Ruth Mackenzie, Kate Malleson, Penny Martin 
and Philippe Sands conducted a series of interviews about selection 
procedures for the ICJ and the ICC; they determined that “few well-
informed insiders appear to be familiar with the details,” and “significant 
variations in practice from one judicial nomination to another frequently 
occur.”
147
  Processes varied substantially from state to state, although most 
states used “informal” nomination processes, sometimes consisting of 
discussions among a few individuals, followed by decisions by powerful 
insiders.
148
 Individuals known to the decision-makers and who lobby for the 
position are most likely to succeed.
149
 A few states appeared to have more 
structured and transparent procedures, but these were relatively rare.
150
  
Overall, processes were “marked by their lack of transparency and 
accountability and a stronger likelihood of being informed by extraneous 
political considerations.  The resulting selection pool was small, there was 
limited outside input into the selection process, and political factors, rather 
than the individual selection criteria, could determine nominations.”
151
  In 
the same vein, in describing the selection of nominees for international 
courts more generally, Daniel Terris, Cesare P.R. Romano and Leigh 
Swigart wrote: 
 
In general, one cannot apply to become an international judge. Most 
of the time one is called. It is not only a matter of having the right 
skills and experience, but most of all a matter of being on the radar 
screen of, and appreciated by, one’s own government, particularly 




Similarly, in their interviews of international commercial arbitrators, 
Dezalay and Garth were told that “It’s a mafia because people appoint one 
another.  You always appoint your friends—people you know,” and “[i]t is 
a club.  They nominate one another.  And sometimes you’re counsel, and 
sometimes you’re arbitrator.”
153
  It is difficult for outsiders to break into the 
                                                 
147
 SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, supra note 20, at 64.  
148
 Id. at 64.  
149
 Id. at 65.  
150
 Id.  
151
 Id. at 95.  
152
 TERRIS, ET AL., supra note 10, at 23. One individual described the 
process of nominating judges to the ICJ and the ICC as “very direct and 
personal and not very institutional-like, [more] a friendship thing.”  
SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, supra note 20, at 86.  
153
 DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 144, at 10.   
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club if they lack information about opportunities or if there are no apparent 
application procedures.  And the lack of transparency at the national 
nomination level precludes accountability or oversight at the domestic level 
by constituencies who might push for greater diversity or more structured 
procedures.   
 In summary, the opacity of national nominations procedures may 
play a role in reducing potential sex representativeness on the bench.   
Without information about available positions and opaque procedures, 
individuals or groups with fewer connections to nominators may simply not 
be aware of openings or choose to refrain from applying if they believe 
decisions have already been made.  Insiders doing the selection have 
incentives to validate their own qualifications as they nominate new 
candidates, and the lack of transparency precludes public accountability.   
C. Elections – May the Best Candidate Win?  
 
 Once a candidate is nominated for an international judgeship, she 
usually must survive election by states in an international body, although 
not in every case.  For example, individual states appoint their judges to the 
ECJ.  Just as with national nominations, the drafters of the constitutive 
instruments of international courts have provided varying degrees of 
direction to states on voting at the international level, in the form of 
statutory mandates or aspirations, or institutionalized screening mechanisms 
to evaluate candidates’ qualifications or rank candidates.  It appears that 
courts with a high degree of direction, either in the form of express 
instructions about how to vote or institutionalized screening mechanisms 
tend to have higher percentages of women judges on the bench.  The courts 
with the greatest amount of direction to states at the international selection 
phase, as well as screening mechanisms, are the International Criminal 
Court and the European Court of Human Rights. These are followed by a 
second group, which includes ECOWAS and the WTO Appellate Body; 
both courts have screening committees, but little statutory guidance on 
selecting among candidates.  The third group has no institutionalized 
screening and some statutory guidance, and it includes the AfCHPR, the 
ICTY and the ICTR.  The remainder of the courts – the IACHR, ICJ, 
ITLOS, and the ATJ – provide the least amount of statutory direction and 
no institutionalized screening mechanism at the international level.  The 
group with the least amount of statutory direction and no institutionalized 
screening mechanisms had among the lowest number of women judges 
historically and the group with the highest amount of screening and 
direction had a greater proportion of women on the bench.  
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1. Group 1: Quotas and Screening  
 
 States are provided the most guidance as to how to select among 
nominees in the International Criminal Court.  First, the Statute requires that 
no two judges be nationals of the same state,
154
 and that state parties must 
consider the need for representation of the principal legal systems of the 
world, equitable geographical representation, and “a fair representation of 
female and male judges.”
155
  They must consider, too, the need to include 
judges with legal expertise on specific issues such as violence against 
women or children.
156
 The President of the Assembly of States Parties may 
extend the nomination period up to six weeks if regional or gender 
minimum voting requirements are not matched with at least twice the 
number of candidates fulfilling the requirement.
157
   
Judges are elected at a meeting of the Assembly of State Parties by 
secret ballot.
158
 The persons elected are the candidates who obtain the 
highest number of votes and a two-thirds majority of the States present and 
voting.
159
 Two lists of candidates are generated in advance of the vote. List 
A contains candidates with criminal law and procedure expertise, while List 
B contains candidates with relevant international law knowledge.
160
  States 
are instructed to vote such that at least 9 and no more than 13 candidates 
from list A and at least 5 and no more than 9 candidates from list B are 
seated on the Court at all times.
161
  Further, each state party is required to 
vote for a minimum number of candidates from each regional group and of 
each gender, and the required number of votes decreases depending on the 
number of candidates available and the number of judges meeting those 
requirements remaining on the bench.
162
  Only ballots complying with the 
voting requirements are valid.
163
  Elections continue until all spots are 
filled.   
 The Assembly of State Parties created an Advisory Committee on 
Nominations to assist states in vetting nominees for judgeships in 2011.
164
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 Rome Statute, supra note 82, art. 36(7).  
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 Id., art. 36(8)(a)(iii).  
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 Id., art. 36(8).  
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 Procedure for nomination to ICC, supra note 84, para. 11.  
158
 Rome statute, supra note 82, art. 36(6)(a).  
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 Id.  
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 Rome Statute, supra note 82, art. 36(5). 
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 Procedure for nomination to ICC, supra note 84, para. 20. 
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 Id., para. 22.  
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 Res. ICC-ASP-10-Res.5-ENG, paras. 19-20 (Dec. 21, 2011).  In the 
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The Advisory Committee evaluates whether nominees proposed by states 
meet the requirements of the Rome Statute.
165
  Despite a mandate for 
geographically and gender diverse membership, the Assembly of State 
Parties ultimately elected a geographically diverse group of eight men and 
one woman to serve on the Committee in October 2012.
166
  The Committee 
has conducted interviews with nominees and reached conclusions about 
their proficiencies in the working languages of the Court and the extent of 
their relevant knowledge and experience.
167
 A candidate whose 
qualifications were questioned by the Advisory Committee was not elected 
to the bench in 2013.
168
  Of all the courts surveyed, the ICC has had the 
highest percentage of women judges of surveyed courts, reaching 61% in 
2009, and at or exceeding 39% for its entire existence.    
 Like the ICC, the ECHR too has an institutional mechanism for 
reviewing candidates before they are voted on by the Parliamentary 
Assembly, in addition to the Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for 
Election as Judge to the ECHR created by the Council of Ministers to 
advise states parties before naming nominees, discussed above.  In 1996, 
the Assembly requested that states utilize a standardized CV to facilitate the 
comparison of candidates, and it expressed its expectation that the Sub-
Committee on Human Rights or an ad hoc sub-committee of the Committee 
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights would interview all candidates on 
                                                                                                                            
same resolution, the Assembly of the State Parties encouraged States Parties 
“to conduct thorough and transparent processes to identify the best 
candidates” for judgeships. Id. 
165
 Report of the Bureau on the Establishment of an Advisory 
Committee on Nominations of judges of the International Criminal Court, 
Tenth Session, U.N. Doc. ICC/ASP/10/36 (Dec. 21, 2011).  
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 Election of the Advisory Committee on Nominations – 2012 
Nomination, International Criminal Court, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/elections/advisorycommitteenominations/Pages/electi
on%20acn-%202012.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2014). 
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 Report of the Advisory Committee on Nomination of Judges on the 
work of its Second Meeting, Twelfth Session, U.N. Doc. ICC/ASP/12/47, 
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visited Jan. 10, 2014) (listing Judge Geoffrey A. Henderson as a sitting 
judge of the ICC).  
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behalf the Parliamentary Assembly.
169
  The sub-committee’s conclusions 
were then forwarded to the Assembly before the vote.
170
  As of January 
2015, the Subcommittee will be replaced by a Committee on the Election of 
Judges to the European Court of Human Rights.
 171
   The new committee, 
composed of twenty people, is charged with studying the standardized CVs 
of all candidates, interviewing candidates, preparing a report to the 
Assembly with a recommendation and a ranking of candidates, along with 
the reasons for its recommendations and rankings, and seeking to ensure 
that the nominating state complied with the Assembly’s criteria for the 
establishment of lists, “and in particular the presence of candidates of both 
sexes.”
172
  The committee may also report to the Assembly on any questions 
related to the national selection procedure.
173
  Any decision to reject a list of 
candidates or to consider a single-sex list of candidates requires a two-thirds 
majority of votes cast.
174
  When the committee chooses to recommend 
rejection of a list, it must provide its reasons to the Assembly.
175
  
Committee members are expected to have “appropriate knowledge or 
practical experience in the legal field.”
176
  Women have accounted for 
between 33% and 40% of the bench for the period of 2008 to 2015, among 
the highest percentages for all the courts surveyed.   
2. Group 2: Screening and Ranking, But Little Statutory Guidance 
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 ECOWAS and the WTO Appellate Body have screening and 
ranking committees, but little statutory guidance to states about how to 
select among candidates.  At ECOWAS, the Community Judicial Council 
composed of chief justices of states without representation on the Court is 
charged with ensuring that the Court is endowed with the best qualified and 
competent persons to contribute, by virtue of their quality and experience” 
to the development of Community law.
177
 The Council not only collects 
applications, but also, it narrows down the applications to three per state, 
interviews the three candidates per state, and then recommends one 
candidate to states for a vote.
178
  
The WTO appears to have a relatively rigorous vetting procedure 
before states vote on members of the Appellate Body.  Once states propose 
candidates, a Selection Committee composed of the Director-General, the 
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, and the Chairmen of the Goods, 
Services, TRIPS and General Councils makes proposals for new 
members.
179
 The Selection Committee requires candidates to take a written 
exam and to participate in an interview process.
180
  Then, member states 
vote on the proposed slate of candidates.
181
 Most, if not all of the time, 
candidates proposed by the Selection Committee are elected.
182
  Despite the 
apparently in-depth interview process in the Committee, some have 
criticized the late announcement of candidates by the Committee to the 
public, and a corresponding lack of public debate about potential 
candidates.
183
 In early 2014, elections were delayed after the Committee 
deadlocked over whom to propose, in response to pressure from African 
countries for an African member of the Body, and US opposition to the 
proposed candidates.
184
   
                                                 
177
 Alter et al., supra note 139, at 760. ECOWAS Newsletter, 4 (October 
2006), available at 
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/newsletter/ECOWAS_NewsLetter_0
1-Eng.pdf (last visited November 12, 2014).     
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 ABEFE ALABI, supra note 141, at 148.  
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 WTO Prep Cmte Recs, supra note 102,para. 13.  
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 Pauwelyn, supra note 103. 
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Body Members, World Trade Organization, 
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In mid-2015, 14% of sitting ECOWAS judges were women, and 
14% of Appellate Body members were women in mid-2015.  One out of 
seven judges on each bench was a woman.   Women have occupied 14% of 
Appellate Body member slots since its establishment, while women 
accountted for 40% of ECOWAS judgeships since establishment.  
3. Group 3: Some Statutory Guidance, But No Screening  
 
 Once state nominees to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights arrive at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
African Union, states elect judges to the court by secret ballot.
185
  The 
Assembly must ensure that “there is representation of the main regions of 
Africa and of their principal legal traditions,” as well as “adequate gender 
representation.”
186
 There is no formal nominating commission or advisory 
panel required in the nomination of judges at the national level or for 
vetting candidates once nominated.  
    The Secretary-General of the United Nations forwards nominees for 
permanent judgeships to the ICTY and the ICTR to the Security Council, 
which then establishes a list of candidates, “taking due account of the 
adequate representation of the principal legal systems of the world.”
187
  No 
additional guidance is provided as to how the Security Council creates the 
list of candidates from the names forwarded to it. The General Assembly 
then votes on the candidates provided by the Security Council; if two 
candidates of the same nationality receive more than an absolute majority of 
votes, the one with the greater number of votes will win.
188
  The constitutive 
instruments also state that “[i]n the overall composition of the Chambers 
and sections of the Trial Chambers, due account shall be taken of the 
experience of the judges in criminal law, international law, including 
international humanitarian law and human rights law.”
189
  For ad litem 
judges, once states have nominated candidates “taking into account the 
importance of a fair representation of female and male candidates,” the 
Secretary-General forwards the nominees to the Security Council, which 
establishes a list of candidates “taking due account of the adequate 
representation of the principal legal systems of the world and bearing in 
                                                 
185
 Protocol to African Charter, supra note 89, art. 14. 
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mind the importance of equitable geographical distribution.”
190
  Then, 




 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was composed of 
18% women judges in mid-2015.  Women have occupied two of the 11 
positions on that court every year since its establishment.  In mid-2015, the 
ICTY and the ICTR had 11% and 22% female permanent judges, 
respectively, and 0% (0 out of 1) and 33% (1 out of 3), ad litem judges, 
respectively.   On the ICTY, women occupied ad litem slots 41% of the 
time since establishment, and 13% of the permanent slots.
192
 On the ICTR, 
women occupied ad litem slots 35% of the time, and permanent slots 21% 
of the time.  
4. Group 4: No Screening and Little Statutory Guidance  
 
 There are no institutional mechanisms for evaluating or ranking 
nominees at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the Andean Tribunal of Justice, or the ICJ, 
although they do have some requirements for voting related to geographic 
distribution of judges.  After states nominate candidates to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, parties to the American Convention on 
Human Rights vote by secret ballot on the candidates.
193
 No two judges can 
be nationals of the same state.
194
 Nonetheless, in 2015, the Open Society 
Justice Initiative, supported by over 70 non-governmental organizations, 
convened a panel of independent experts to review and comment on 
candidates for the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human 
Rights.
195
  The panel surveyed the application materials, asked candidates to 
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 These statistics were obtained by adding up the total number of slots 
in which women judges served since the courts were established and 
dividing it by the total number of slots in which both male and female 
judges served since establishment.  
193
 IACHR Statute, supra note 96, arts. 6-9; American Convention on 
Human Rights arts. 53-54, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 
OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1 corr. 1 (1970) (entered into force July 
18, 1978), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American 
Convention]. States choose their own ad hoc judges when appropriate, and 
there is no vote required by states parties to the Inter-American Court. 
IACHR Statute, supra note 96, art. 10. 
194
 IACHR Statute, supra note 96, art. 4.  
195
  Press Release, Open Society Justice Initiative, New Independent 
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complete a questionnaire, looked at publicly available information on each 
candidate, and opined on the suitability of the various candidates.
196
 For the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, after states nominate 
candidates, states parties vote by secret ballot as well.  To be elected, 
nominees must obtain the largest number of votes and a two-thirds majority 
of states present and voting, so long as the majority includes a majority of 
states parties.
197
  No two members of the tribunal can share nationality, and 
there must be at least three members from each geographical group 
established by the United Nations General Assembly.
198
  The ITLOS Statute 
also provides that “[i]n the Tribunal as a whole the representation of the 
principal legal systems of the world and equitable geographical distribution 
shall be assured.”
199
   
 Once states nominate candidates to the ICJ, the General Assembly 
and the Security Council independently vote on the candidates.
200
  
Candidates who receive an absolute majority of votes in both chambers are 
elected.
201
  Traditionally, candidates proposed by the permanent members 
of the Security Council always get elected.
202
 States may not elect two 
nationals of the same state.
203
  The ICJ Statute provides that “electors shall 
bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should individually 
possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the 
representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal 
systems of the world should be assured.”
204
  For the Andean Tribunal of 
Justice, each state nominates three candidates, and then each judge must be 
                                                                                                                            
Panel Will Monitor Election of Inter-American Human Rights 




 See Independent Panel Report, supra note 69.    
197
 ITLOS Statute, supra note 96, art. 4. 
198
 Id., art. 3 
199
 Id., art. 2. There is no vote required for ad hoc judges appointed by 






 MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 7 (2010). 
203
 ICJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 3. Ad hoc judges are appointed by 
states without a vote, but “[s]uch person shall be chosen preferably from 
among those persons who have been nominated as candidates” to 
permanent judge positions.  Id., art. 9. 
204
 Id., art. 9.  
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unanimously selected by all four contracting parties.
205
  No commission is 
involved in vetting candidates or providing guidelines to states in voting at 
the international level.   
 These courts have among the lowest numbers of women on the 
bench historically. Women have occupied following percentage of slots on 
these courts: IACHR – 10%, ITLOS – 2%, the ICJ – 3%, the Andean 
Tribunal – 12%, and the AfCHPR – 18%.  Nonetheless, the Andean 
Tribunal currently has 50% women judges on its four-member bench.   
*** 
 Just as reading constitutive instruments alone does not provide a 
complete picture of national nominations procedures, neither does a survey 
of formal elections procedures at the international level.   Despite the high-
minded qualifications language found in many courts’ founding documents, 
states’ decisions about whom to vote for appear to be rooted in political 
horse-trading, rather than merit.
206
  In a study of judges on the ICTY and 
ICTR, Michael Bohlander determined that eight out of 25 judges at the 
ICTY and the appeals chamber shared with the ICTR had no prior criminal 
judicial experience, many of them had no experience in international 
criminal law, and many did not have even fifteen years of relevant 
professional experience.
207
  In the same vein, the International Bar 
Association expressed concerns that, for many courts, “there is no prior 
consideration of whether candidates for appointment to international 
judicial office conform to the requirements for appointment according to 
any stated criteria.”
208
  And seats on international benches are often seen as 
“bargaining chips in the diplomatic process,” where individuals receive 
votes because of the lobbying efforts and power of their states, not because 
of their individual achievements.
209
  Scholars have noted states’ difficulty in 
                                                 
205
 ATJ Treaty, supra note 96, art. 7. 
206
 TERRIS ET AL., supra note 10, at 34 ; SELECTING INTERNATIONAL 
JUDGES, supra note 20, at 77 (“Success depends to a large extent on vote 
trading and campaigning…”); Id. at 102.  
207
 Michael Bohlander, The International Criminal Judiciary – 
Problems of Judicial Selection, Independence and Ethics, in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS 
AND PROCEDURES 354 (Michael Bohlander, ed. 2007).  
208
 International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute, Background 
Paper to the Institute’s Resolution on the Values Pertaining to Judicial 
Appointments to International Courts and Tribunals, para. 6 (31 October 
2011) [hereinafter IBA’s Background Paper]. 
209
 TERRIS, ET AL., supra note 10, at 34.  
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verifying independently the qualifications of proposed candidates.
210
  
Political factors appear to play “the important, if not central, role” in 
elections, at least where the ICJ and the ICC are concerned.
211
  The 
International Bar Association summarized the state of play with respect to 
international court and tribunal elections succinctly: “Geopolitical 
considerations – rather than objective merits, experience, qualifications and 
personal qualities of the candidates – predominate in the final process.”
212
  
To what extent does this lack of emphasis on qualifications and 
merit at the international level potentially affect diversity on the bench? By 
the time states are voting, the candidates have already been nominated.  Yet 
a comparison of procedures to elect judges at the international level 
suggests that courts with institutionalized screening procedures may have 
greater numbers of women on the bench.  Three of the four courts that 
utilize committees to screen candidates had relatively high numbers of 
female judges in mid-2015, or high percentages of slots allocated to women 
since 1999, or since establishment, whichever came later.  These include the 
ICC (39%, 47%), the ECHR (33%, 29%), and ECOWAS (14%, 40%).  The 
WTO Appellate Body, however, had only 14% women judges in mid-2015, 
and 17% of judicial slots went to women.  The courts with the lowest 
percentages of slots allocated to women since establishment included those 
with the least amount of institutional screening, such as the IACHR (10%), 
ITLOS (2%), the ICJ (3%), and the Andean Tribunal of Justice (12%).  
Women have served in only six percent of available slots on the ECJ, which 
has no international voting procedure at all.  Although it is difficult to 
disentangle national nominations procedures, screening mechanisms, and 
emphasis on equal representation on the bench in constitutive instruments, 
the data suggest a correlation may exist between institutionalized screening 
and guidance at the international voting stage and a more sex representative 
bench.   
 The extent to which non-governmental organizations and other 
stakeholders are involved in the screening of candidates and the degree of 
candidate information accessible to the public may also affect the 
composition of the bench.  A systematic study of NGOs’ role in 
international judicial selection procedures is necessary to better understand 
their effect.  Nonetheless, NGOs appear to be involved in screening 
candidates when information is available to them.  For example, the 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court has provided its own 
questionnaire to ICC candidates, interviewed candidates, and held public 
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events with candidates and experts and public debates among the candidates 
“to expand on their respective qualifications and expertise, as well as to 
promote fully-informed decision-making by States Parties delegates.”
213
 
Other NGOs have pushed for greater transparency and procedures at the 
national nomination and international levels.  For example, Human Rights 
Watch complained about the selection procedures utilized by Russia in 
generating its list of candidates for the ECHR in 2012.
214
 Civil society 
organizations urged states to use more rigorous, open, transparent and 
participatory procedures in national nominations to the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.
215
 The Open Society Justice Initiative and over 
70 NGOs have pushed for greater transparency and screening of Inter-
American Court candidates.
216
 Others have complained that the late listing 
of WTO Appellate Body member candidates precludes substantive public 
debate about their merits.
217
  
D. Sex Representation Requirements  
 
 What about sex representation aspirations or requirements at the 
national nomination or international election levels? Aspirational statements 
encouraging states to nominate both men and women may not be as 
successful as mandates to do so.  For example, states parties to the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights are supposed to give “[d]ue 
consideration” to “adequate gender representation in the nomination 
process.”
 218
 But no binding statutory guidance explains to states how they 
should implement this mandate, and it is doubtful whether states are taking 
to heart the African Union Commission’s suggestions to include civil 
society and enhance transparency, or even to nominate women in the first 
place. The percentage of women judges on the court has been stuck at 18% 
                                                 
213
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> Election of ICC and ASP Officials > Judges, available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=electionjudges (last visited December 15, 
2014). 
214
 Letter to the European Court of Human Rights Regarding the 
Selection Procedure for Candidates from the Russian Federation from Hugh 
Williamson, Executive Director, Europe and Central Asia Division, Human 
Rights Watch, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/11/letter-
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since its establishment through 2015.    
 On the other hand, 41% of ad litem judicial slots on the ICTY have 
gone to women, while women have occupied only 13% of permanent judge 
spots.  The numbers are 35% and 21%, respectively, for the ICTR.  States 
are required to take into account the need for a fair representation of both 
sexes only with respect to ad litem judges, suggesting that the 
representativeness requirement at the national nomination stage may make a 
difference. Like the African Court, however, no guidance exists as to how 
this mandate should be implemented.  The historical data on these courts, 
found at Figures 9 and 10, appears compelling, nonetheless. It shows that 
since ad litem judges were added to the ICTY in 2001, women have always 
served in a significantly higher percentage of ad litem positions than 
permanent ones. Similarly, women accounted for a greater percentage of ad 
litem than permanent judges on the ICTR, almost every year since ad litem 
judges were added in 2004, and until the number of ad litem judges was 
reduced to only one in 2013.   
 Mandatory or virtually mandatory requirements to include both 
sexes at the bench appear to correlate with a dramatically higher percentage 
of women on the bench.  Women have made up at least 39% of the 
International Criminal Court every year since its establishment, and the ICC 
has what amounts to a quota requirement at the international election stage.  
As for the European Court of Human Rights, almost immediately after the 
Parliamentary Assembly began drawing states’ attention to the issue of sex 
representation on the bench in 1996, the number of women elected rose 
dramatically.  The percentage of women judges jumped from 3% to 18% 
between 1997 and 1998.  Then, shortly after the Parliamentary Assembly 
invited the Committee of Ministers to encourage states to apply a set of 
criteria to national nominations in 1999, including open calls for candidates, 
experience in human rights, and candidates of both sexes,
 219
 the percentage 
of women judges again increased, this time, from 17% in 1999 and 2000, to 
22% in 2001. This jump coincided with a Parliamentary Assembly 
instruction to the relevant Parliamentary Assembly subcommittee on 
elections to ensure that member states apply the stated criteria.
 220
  In 2004, 
the Parliamentary Assembly decided it would no longer consider unisex 
lists of candidates;
 221
 the percentage of women judges rose from 23% in 
                                                 
219
 Recommendation 1429(1999), National procedures for nominating 
candidates for election to the European Court of Human Rights.   
220
  Order No. 558 (1999), National procedures for nominating 
candidates for election to the European Court of Human Rights.  
221
 Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights, Resolution 
1366 (2004). 
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2004 to 40% seven years later.  Although Malta challenged the list 
requirement and states have submitted unisex male lists on at least two 
occasions, 
222
 the percentage of women judges has not dropped below 33% 
since 2008, four years after the requirement was imposed.  
 Figure 15 shows the percentage of slots per year filled by women 
judges from 1999 to 2015, or since establishment until 2015, if the Court 
was founded after 1999.   Interestingly, of the five courts with the highest 
percentages of slots allocated to women, four had either quotas or 
aspirational language to include women on the bench: the ICC, the ICTY 
for ad litem judges, the ICTR for ad litem judges, and the ECHR.   Of the 
seven courts with the lowest percentages of slots going to women, none had 
quotas or aspirational language seeking a fair representation of women on 
the bench.   
 
 
                                                 
222
 See, e.g., List and curricula vitae of candidates submitted by the 
Government of the Republic of Moldova (28 Aug. 2012), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/2012/COE.PACE.WD.C
OM.13027.2012.EN.pdf (proposing three male candidates); Letter   to the 
Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly from the Belgian Federal 
Department 
of Justice, dated 7 July 2011, at 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewPDF.asp?FileID=12986&lang=en (proposing three male candidates) 
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Figure 15. Percentage slots allocated to women from 1999 to 
2015 (or establishment to 2015 if established after 1999) 
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Table 2 shows the percentage of women judges on international courts 
in mid-2015, comparing courts with sex representation requirements or 
aspirational language. Table 3 shows those courts without such 
requirements.  While women account for 15% of judges on courts without 
sex representation requirements, they make up 32% of judges on courts 
with such requirements or aspirational language 
 
Table 2. Female Participation on Courts without Sex 

























































Table 3. Female Participation on Courts with Representativeness 
Requirements (mid-2015) 
































Although, due to the small number of courts involved, these 
comparisons are not statistically significant, they provide compelling 
circumstantial evidence that quotas and aspirational language may make a 
difference in getting women on the bench.  At the same time, two of the five 
courts with sex representation requirements, the ICC and the ECHR, also 
happen to have among the most guidance and screening at the international 
election level, and the ECHR provides meaningful instruction to states at 
the national nomination stage.  Also, ECOWAS and the WTO appear to 
have screening and ranking before elections take place, yet the percentage 
of women judges was relatively low on both courts’ benches in mid-2015.  
Nonetheless, 40% of slots have gone to women on ECOWAS since it was 
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established.  17% have gone to women on the WTO Appellate Body since 
establishment.    
E. Summarizing the Reasons for the Paucity of Women on the Bench 
 
The limited pool argument does not adequately explain the paucity 
of women judges on international courts. It assumes that selection 
procedures are implemented to select the most meritorious candidates, yet 
ample evidence exists that political horse-trading, political patronage and 
other considerations may trump.  Also, given the low number of 
international judgeships available, only a small pool of women is necessary 
to achieve parity on the bench.  Finally, states that appear to have greater 
pools do not necessarily nominate more women than states with smaller 
pools, suggesting that something other than the pool is playing a significant 
role in judicial nominations.  Opaque nominations procedures at the 
national level likely create obstacles for less well-connected or “outsider” 
candidates to make it through to the next stage of the elections process. 
Despite the political nature of elections at the international level, courts 
with institutional screening mechanisms may draw greater numbers of 
women to the bench.  Finally, courts with explicit requirements for sex 
representativeness have been more successful at achieving it than courts 
without such provisions.   
Other factors aside from or instead of national nomination 
procedures, institutional screening mechanisms, and representativeness 
mandates may also be at play, particularly with regard to historical 
statistics.  These may include when the court was established, changes in 
attitudes toward women, and greater participation in the workforce over 
time.  Since fewer women were qualified to serve as judges in the 1950s 
than today, older courts would appear more likely to have fewer women as 
a percentage of the bench since establishment.  Also, all the courts with 
representativeness mandates or aspirations began functioning after 1990, 
excluding the ECHR, where a sex representation requirement was instituted 
in 2004.   Nonetheless, ITLOS is among the younger courts, and it has 
among the lowest percentages of women on the bench historically.     
Interestingly, all courts with representativeness requirements are 
human rights or international criminal courts, raising the question whether 
subject matter jurisdiction might make some sort of difference, rather than 
statutory language. Just as states are happy to appoint a plethora of women 
to the CEDAW monitoring body, perhaps states are more willing to 
nominate and vote for women candidates on courts deciding international 
human rights and criminal law issues, which may be perceived to implicate 
what may be deemed “women’s concerns.”  On the other hand, perhaps the 
willingness exists in theory alone: the Inter-American Court of Human 
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Rights has only one woman on the bench, and the African Court appears to 
be stuck at a maximum of two.  
A lack of state and domestic constituencies’ commitment to 
diversity on international court benches may, too, contribute to keeping 
benches homogeneous.  While such a disposition may have helped to 
diversify the United States federal judiciary,
223
 it is not readily discernable 
at the international level for many international courts.  In their interviews 
of judges and individuals involved in judicial selection for the International 
Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, Mackenzie and her 
colleagues found that interviewees expressed mixed views about the 
importance of sex representation on the bench.  One questioned the need for 
emphasizing gender given the increased enrollment of women on law 
faculties in the West.  Others expressed concerns that appointing female 
candidates would result in a drop in quality of judges.  Still others 
challenged the use of the gender quotas on the ICC, suggesting that it was 
unfair that seven seats went to women in the first ICC election.  While the 
requirements for legal, linguistic and geographical diversity were widely 




Minimal direct advocacy on the issue of sex representation on most 
international courts historically may be to blame for ambivalence about the 
paucity of women on the bench. In discussing President Carter’s historic 
advancement of women on the federal judicial bench in the US, Sally 
Kenney proposed that change occurs when people mobilize, especially 
strategically placed insiders collaborating with outside groups.
225
  Perhaps 
the same applies to the inclusion of women judges on the International 
Criminal Court.  The reason the Rome Statute has a gender 
representativeness requirement is because groups advocated vigorously for 
it.
226
  Interest groups argued that the ICTY, founded in the wake of over ten 
thousand rapes in the former Yugoslavia, should have had more women on 
the bench.
227
  They suggested that the presence of people like Navanethem 
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Pillay on the ICTR made a difference in the development of international 
criminal law, and that it was essential that the ICC have women’s voices on 
it, not just experts on violence against women and children.
228
  Arguably, 
the ICC has had such high representation of women judges because NGOs 
and sympathetic states pushed for the for the “fair representation” 
requirement in the statute and NGOs “made extensive efforts to bring 
forward the names of women who met the election requirements, 
particularly from those countries that had little diplomatic leverage to get 
one of their nationals elected.  Once some of these women were nominated, 
NGOs vigorously lobbied states to elect them.”
229
 
Domestic constituencies may pay little attention to the percentage of 
women judges on international courts due to a lack of knowledge of and 
interest in their activities.  Simply, people are more likely to know and care 
about courts in their own communities than in far-flung places across the 
world, with little perceived significance for their daily lives.  Consequently, 
individuals vetting, nominating and electing judges on behalf of states face 
little domestic political pressure to propose or vote for a diverse slate of 
candidates.  The lack of transparency around nominations and elections also 
serves to shield officials from the public view on this issue.  While domestic 
constituencies may push for the inclusion of women on domestic benches, 
they may be unaware that selection is even taking place for international 
ones.     
Perhaps calls for more representative benches are beginning to grow 
louder, at least for some courts.  More people are studying and questioning 
extreme sex unrepresentativeness on international commercial and 
investment treaty arbitral panels.
230
  Non-governmental organizations such 
as the Center for Justice and International Law, are organizing events 
around the selection and nomination processes at the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights.  Other groups, such as the International Association of 
Women Judges, foster networks of women judges from around the world 
and share information about vacancies when they are announced.  On the 
other hand, it is rare to hear people decrying the paucity of women judges 
on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or the WTO Appellate 
Body. 
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
                                                 
228
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2014).  
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 Opaque and closed selection procedures at the national nomination 
and international elections levels, political horse-trading, and a lack of 
advocacy around and sunlight on the issue of representativeness on the 
bench are likely facilitating sex unrepresentativeness on most international 
court benches.  In light of these conclusions, what reforms to judicial 
selection procedures would increase sex representativeness on international 
benches? This Part proposes methods for enhancing openness and 
transparency at the national nomination and international voting levels.  It 
also analyzes why states may, in many instances, be against what appear to 
be reasonable and legitimacy-enhancing reforms.  Mandatory quotas or 
aspirational targets may be advisable should enhanced procedures fail, or as 
an alternative to them.  The feasibility or desirability of potential reforms 
may vary by the court involved.     
A. Enhance Candidate Selection Procedures 
 
To improve the probability of the nomination of women as well as 
other non-status quo candidates for international judgeships, national 
selection procedures must be made more open and accessible for courts 
where they are currently closed and opaque.  Rather than simply giving 
national groups or state officials completely unfettered and unguided 
discretion in selecting nominees, qualifications requirements and 
procedures to be employed at the national level should be spelled out in 
greater detail by the states that utilize these courts. For example, states 
parties could pass resolutions, like the Assembly of the State Parties to the 
ICC, clarifying what kinds of qualities and experiences they expect judges 
will have.  Like the procedures for nominating judges to the European Court 
of Human Rights, relevant political bodies can provide examples of 
different procedures or “best practices” that can be utilized in the 
nomination and selection of candidates at the national level.  These 
practices might include public advertisement for potential candidates, a 
more detailed description of the candidate evaluation process and necessary 
qualifications, participants in the nomination and evaluation processes, and 
deadlines.   
Alternatively, or in addition, all states could be required to detail 
what standards and procedures they intend to use in their domestic 
nomination processes, what procedure took place, and how many nominees 
were considered, along with their list of nominees.  This information could 
then be filed with the Registrar of the relevant court.  The idea is that if 
states must draft explicit standards and procedures for international judge 
nominees, they are more likely to employ them.  Such requirements will 
help to identify a broader pool of candidates and show the public, including 
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interested NGOs, what procedures are followed. If nomination procedures 
are brought to the attention of interested members of the public, officials 
charged with selecting candidates are less likely simply to go with who they 
know and more likely to conduct a search with a more diverse and 
meritorious pool of candidates.    
Another way to make the process more transparent is to allow non-
state actors to take part in vetting potential candidates or to require states to 
create national nominating commissions which represent the relevant 
constituencies in a particular state.  If commissions are used, they should 
reflect the diverse makeup of the society.
231
  States could also create 
commissions composed of relevant stakeholders at the international level to 
vet candidates proposed by states, as the ICC, the ECHR, ECOWAS and the 
ECJ are currently doing to different extents.  Commissions could be 
composed of individuals with some knowledge of the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the relevant court and guidance about necessary 
qualifications for competent judges.  As suggested by the International Bar 
Association, such commissions could draw on the model of the United 
Nations Internal Justice Council as well.
232
  The United Nations General 
Assembly created the Council, composed of reputable lawyers and a small 
secretariat to be appointed by the United Nations Secretary General, to 
propose lists of qualified candidates to states for the UN tribunals charged 
with hearing internal staff complaints.
233
 
Shining light on, requiring systematization of and involving more 
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stakeholders in selection procedures is more likely to result in the 
consideration of a broader and more competent array of candidates because 
of greater public participation and accountability.  Closed, opaque 
procedures, on the other hand, create few incentives for those choosing 
nominees to move beyond their own personal contact lists and to forego the 
benefits that may accrue to them personally by choosing people within their 
own networks.  
Yet states may have principled reasons to reject enhanced 
procedures. States may prefer the opportunity to control tightly the 
nomination and election process for international judges rather than opening 
it to the light of day.  Creating commissions and transparency may run 
counter to their understanding of the proper relationship between states and 
international courts more generally. Erik Voeten has identified a number of 
motivations which may affect how a state approaches international judicial 
appointments, including signaling credible commitments to a particular 
cause such as human rights, influencing the court’s decision-making in a 
way that protects a state’s sovereign interests or promotes an activist 
agenda, advancing liberal internationalist norms, and political 
patronage.234  Keeping the selection process primarily in the hands of 
individual states may allow states more effectively to pursue some of these 
goals.  For example, at the national level, opacity and lack of procedure 
simplifies the nomination process and gives state officials the opportunity to 
grant political favors. Public calls for nominations and national selection 
commissions would limit a state official’s ability to reward loyalists.   
In addition, unfettered discretion makes it possible for states to 
promote candidates who will vote in line with a state’s perceived interests 
and broader foreign policy agenda. Provided closed and opaque selection 
procedures, national governments may select or vote on candidates because 
they believe individuals will vote in a particular way should issues of 
importance to that state arise.  For example, a large state with a powerful 
military may choose an ICC candidate who would interpret broadly key 
terms in international criminal and humanitarian law such as “necessity” 
and “proportionality,” so that the law develops in a manner that gives the 
state greater flexibility in its war-waging techniques.  A smaller, less 
powerful state might choose a candidate with a narrower understanding as a 
protective measure against its larger and aggressive neighbors.  
Hypotheticals are unnecessary to make the point.  As Voeten has 
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 See generally Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial 
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demonstrated, governments in favor of European integration chose more 
activist judges for the European Court of Human Rights.
235
  In the same 
vein, the United States and other states have taken an active role in 
interviewing and vetting candidates for membership on the WTO Appellate 
Body to ensure their consistency with their interests.
236
 They have de facto 
vetoed candidates who disagree or are perceived to disagree with them on 
important policy matters.
237
 The less power states have to nominate and 
elect the candidates of their choice, the less likely they are able to shape the 
future decisions of international courts.  
Eric Posner and John Yoo might add that enhanced selection 
procedures promote the “independent” nature of many international courts, 
which may undermine their effectiveness. Posner and Yoo define 
“independence” as “a measure of the tribunal member’s vulnerability to the 
state that appoints him. Tribunals composed of dependent members have a 
strong incentive to serve the joint interests of the disputing states.”
 238
  
Independent members, on the other hand, are less motivated to serve 
disputing states’ interests, and morals, ideology and the interests of other 
states may influence their decision-making.
239
  Because independent judges’ 
rulings are less likely to appease the litigating parties than dependent 
judges, compliance will decline, and so will the effectiveness of the 
Court.
240
  Transparent selection procedures with screening at the 
international level are more likely to produce independent judges.  Members 
of selection commissions at the international level are likely to screen out or 
rank lower candidates they perceive as biased toward a particular state or set 
of interests, so long as the commission itself is composed of individuals 
representing states with diverse interests.   
But if a state’s goals are to promote the rule of law or signal a 
commitment to a particular normative regime, it may prefer to appoint 
judges through transparent and merit-based process. Alternatively, whether 
states perceive adjudicators as trustees of a particular legal regime, rather 
than agents who merely reflect their policy preferences, may affect their 
disposition to more open and merit-based selection procedures.  In 
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distinguishing between trustees and agents in the international courts 
context, Karen Alter wrote,  
 
Principals choose to delegate to Trustees, as opposed to 
Agents, when the point of delegation is to harness the authority of 
the Trustee so as to enhance the legitimacy of political decision-
making. Trustees are (1) selected because of their personal 
reputation or professional norms, (2) given independent authority to 
make decisions according to their best judgment or professional 




Agents, on the other hand, are expected to be loyal to and implement the 
decisions of the Principal.
242
 Screening commissions at the international 
level may serve to filter out Agents in favor of Trustees.  They may choose 
judges who will interpret the law with reference to the prevailing legal 
discourse, professional norms and moral ideals rather than in accord with 
the political sensibilities of the Principal.  
Open procedures at the national level and international screening or 
ranking of candidates for international judicial office decrease states’ ability 
to affect substantive legal decision-making in international courts.  They 
cannot simply choose the candidate who they expect will vote their way on 
a given matter.  At the same time, these enhanced procedures are more 
likely to result in decision-making that is independent from state influence 
and focused on cultivating the rule of law, qualities which strengthen the 
legitimacy of these institutions.  And it appears that such enhanced 
procedures coincide with greater opportunity for women, and perhaps 
others, to serve on international court benches.   
B. Aspirational Targets or Temporary Mandatory Quotas 
 
Enhanced procedures may not be acceptable to states, or they may 
not work to change the sex unrepresentative status quo.  What about 
aspirational targets or quotas? A comparison of courts with 
representativeness requirements against courts without them suggests that 
representativeness requirements are correlated with greater numbers of 
women judges on the bench over time.  From their establishment until mid-
2015, women have occupied only 15% of slots of courts without 
representation requirements, as compared to 32% of slots for courts with 
them.  While the percentage of women judges has increased over time for 
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both categories of courts, the overall percentage of women judges on courts 
with no representativeness requirement has never broken 20%.  It has 
reached 40% for courts with representativeness requirements.    
Consequently, the adoption of aspirational language or of mandatory targets 
may result in better sex representativeness on the bench.  Mandatory targets 
could be adopted at the nomination stage, as the ECHR does, or quotas 
could be instituted at the voting phase, as the ICC does.  This section 
considers the pros and cons of such measures, and ultimately concludes 
that, should enhanced selection procedures fail to achieve more sex 
representative bodies, or should states disfavor them, temporary mandatory 
measures are worth considering.     
Concrete steps to open up international courts benches to women are 
not only permitted by international law, but also may be required by it.  
CEDAW’s Article 11 specifies that “States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of 
employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, 
the same rights, in particular: …(b) [t]he right to the same employment 
opportunities, including the application of the same criteria for selection in 
matters of employment.”
243
  States have agreed that the use of special 
measures of a temporary duration may very well be appropriate to foster 
equality.
244
  As of June 2014, 188 states considered themselves to be parties 
to CEDAW.
245
   
The 1995 Beijing Declaration, subsequently adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly, emphasized the importance of full participation 
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in decision-making and access to power.
246
 In the Beijing Platform, states 
agreed to  
 
Commit themselves to establishing the goal of gender balance in 
governmental bodies and committees, as well as in public 
administrative entities, and in the judiciary, including, inter alia, 
setting specific targets and implementing measures to substantially 
increase the number of women with a view to achieving equal 
representation of women and men, if necessary through positive 




With respect to United Nations bodies, states agreed to “[a]im at gender 
balance in the lists of national candidates nominated for election or 
appointment to United Nations bodies, specialized agencies and other 
autonomous organizations of the United Nations system, particularly for 
posts at the senior level.”
248
 Other global and regional treaties authorize and 
promote the use of temporary measures to ensure equality of opportunity 
and non-discrimination, including the International Labor Organization’s 
Convention No. 111
249
 and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.
250
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Interestingly, aspirational and mandatory targets have become more 
broadly accepted in the domestic political context in recent years, and they 
exist in over one hundred countries in various forms.
251
 For example, 
France requires all political parties to list equal numbers of men and women 
in most elections,
252
 Rwanda’s Constitution specifies that at least 30% of 
each decision-making body must be composed of women.
253
  Argentina 
mandates that women must be placed in electable positions on party lists.
254
  
The Iraqi Constitution aims for at least one-quarter of the Council of 
Representatives to consist of women.
255
  At least a few states have adopted 
quotas for the judiciary as well. The Transitional Constitution of South 
Sudan states that “[t]here shall be a substantial representation of women in 
the Judiciary having regard to competence, integrity, credibility and 
impartiality.”
256
 Belgium recently adopted a quota for women on its 
constitutional court.
257
   
In response to low participation of women on European corporate 
boards and low growth rates over time, some legislatures have instituted 
mandatory minimum requirements.
258
 Norway instituted a 40% of either sex 
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  Constitution of Iraq, art. 49, available at 
http://iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf. 
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requirement on boards of all privately owned public limited companies, and 
non-compliance can result in penalties and even dissolution of the 
company.
259
  Since the institution of the quota, participation on corporate 
boards rose from 25% in 2004 to 42% in 2009.
260
  In March 2007, Spain 
passed a law requiring public companies and other large firms with more 
than 250 employees to develop plans to promote equal participation on 
boards and to try to achieve 40% participation of each sex within eight 
years.
261
  In late 2010, France adopted a law requiring listed companies and 
companies with 500 or more employees and revenues over 50 million euros 
to appoint 40% women on boards within six years.
262
 The Netherlands, 
Italy, and Belgium also adopted quota laws. 
263
  Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom make reference to gender in corporate governance codes.
264
 A 
study by the European Commission’s Network on to Promote Women in 
Decision-making in Politics and the Economy asserted that “a wave of 
quota debates is sweeping over Europe, creating more awareness with the 
public and putting pressure on companies and governments to make fast and 
fundamental changes in the representation of women in decision-
making.”
265
 In November 2013, the EU Parliament voted to require 
European companies to hire 40% women for corporate board positions by 
2020.
266
  The issue of gender diversity on corporate boards and possible 
remedies including quotas has been discussed in non-European countries as 
well, including South Africa and Australia.
267
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 Despite the now widespread use of quotas at the political level, on 
corporate boards, and to a lesser extent, in judiciaries, counter-arguments to 
the use of mandatory quotas exist.  It is more difficult to find arguments 
against aspirational targets.  Aspirational targets simply point out to 
nominators that sex representation is a worthwhile goal.  They express the 
community of relevant states’ values about who should be represented on 
the bench as a whole, but they impose no requirement to reject or accept a 
candidate based on sex.  From a political standpoint, aspirational language 
may show domestic political constituencies that their states have, at least, a 
political commitment to sex representation. (One could imagine a more 
widespread use of such language to encompass other groups as well, such as 
to include indigenous people or people of minority status within their own 
states.)  Aspiring to a fair representation of the sexes led to a dramatic 
difference on the ICTY and the ICTR between the percentage of women 
serving as ad litem (aspirational sex representativeness language) as 
compared to permanent judges (no such language). Women served in much 
higher percentages on the ad litem bench.
268
  On the other hand, women 
have made up only 18% of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights bench.  Nonetheless, there are many other courts with even lower 
percentages of women on the bench in June 2015, including ITLOS, 
IACHR, ECOWAS, the WTO Appellate Body, and the ICTY’s permanent 
judges.  
  Some might argue that targets of any kind are not worthwhile if they 
do not result in “substantive representation,” or the promotion of women’s 
concerns.
269
  The jury is still out on whether sex representativeness affects 
international court decision-making, although there is some evidence that it 
may make a difference in at least some cases. A 2007 study on the role of 
gender in sexual assault decisions of international criminal tribunals 
excluded the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in part because 
there were “too few [women judges] to conduct empirical analysis…”
270
 
The same study found that ICTY panels with female judges imposed more 
severe sanctions on defendants who assaulted women, while male judges 
imposed more severe sanctions on defendants who assaulted men.
271
 
Another study showed that women judges were much more likely to rule in 
favor of jurisdiction in cases under the auspices of the International Centre 
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for the Settlement of Investment Disputes than men.
272
   
 A number of studies have sought to understand the relationship 
between gender and judging in the United States, scholarship which may 
help to illuminate the gender effect of judging in international courts, in the 
absence of additional international data.  Although many studies show a 
limited or non-existent effect of gender on judging, cases involving family 
law and discrimination appear to be an exception.
273
  One study found that a 
sex discrimination plaintiff was 10 percentage points less likely to prevail if 
the judge was male, and when a woman was present on a panel deciding 
such a case, men were more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff.
274
  
Another study showed that asylum applicants randomly assigned to women 
judges were 44% more likely to prevail than those facing male judges. 
275
 
Anecdotal evidence at the international level may also be instructive 
in understanding that a gender diverse bench makes a difference.  A number 
of female judges have made statements implying that their experiences as 
women gave them a particular sensitivity in certain cases.  These include 
former D.C. Court of Appeals and International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia Judge Patricia Wald, former International Criminal 
Court Judge Navenathem Pillay, and former Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Judge Cecilia Medina.
276
  For example, Judge Wald wrote:  
 
…being a woman and being treated by society as a woman can be a 
vital element of a judge’s experience.  That experience in turn can 
subtly affect the lens through which she views issues and 
solutions…. A judge is the sum of her experiences and if she has 
suffered disadvantages of discrimination as a woman, she is apt to 
be sensitive to its subtle expressions or to paternalism.
277
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She has also pointed to five different major gender-crime precedents issued 
when at least one woman sat on the bench.
278
  Judge Pillay suggested that 
although women do not “decide in a different way,” they have a “particular 
sensitivity and understanding about what happens to people who are 
raped.”
279
 Former Inter-American Court Judge Cecilia Medina Quiroga 
posited that her womanly perspective changed the reparations outcome in a 
case involving a massacre and rape in Guatemala.
280
  
 National judges and lawyers from all over the world have made 
similar points.  For example, United States Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
while expressing doubts about the accuracy of studies on gender and 
judging, suggested that “the presence of women on the bench made it 
possible for the courts to appreciate earlier than they might otherwise that 
sexual harassment belongs under Title VII.”
281
  Madame Justice Bertha 
Wilson, the first woman on Canada’s court of last resort asserted that for 
entire areas of the law, “there is no uniquely feminine perspective,” but in 
others, “a distinctly male perspective is clearly discernible…”
282
 In the 
same vein, Lady Baroness Hale, the sole woman ever to have served on the 
United Kingdom’s highest court, posited that women bring “different 
perceptions to the task of fact-finding—which is what most judges do much 
of the time.”
283
 A European Commission survey of male and female judges 
and other legal professionals found that, in cases involving violence against 
women or children, family issues, and sometimes sex discrimination, “it is 
recognized (mainly by the women interviewed that gender does have an 
influence.”
284
  Although she thought gender made little difference most of 
the time, an Israeli judge pointed out a number of instances where she 
thought it did make a difference, including commercial cases and cases 
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  Some may argue that the presence of both men and women may 
matter for some but not all courts.  For example, sex representativeness may 
be important on international criminal and human rights courts because 
male and female judges may perceive gender-biased violence in different 
ways, and victims may feel less comfortable relating such stories to a unisex 
court.
286
  Further, for human rights courts in particular, some constituencies 
will question the values and impartiality of a human rights court where half 
of humanity is missing from the bench.  If women judges relate to rape or 
crimes of violence against women in a different way than men, then both 
are necessary on the bench for impartiality.  On the other hand, a mixed 
bench may be unnecessary or irrelevant for a court that interprets the Law 
of the Sea or trade agreements.  If there is no difference in substantive 
outcome, why is important to have a female or male judge on the Law of 
the Sea Tribunal or on the WTO Appellate Body?   
The presence of both sexes on the bench is important, regardless of 
subject matter or whether a unique feminine or male perspective exists on a 
particular factual or legal issue.  International courts exercise public 
authority by interpreting and shaping international law.
287
  Democratic 
values such as representation provide meaningful justification for the 
exercise of such authority.
288
  In essence, those affected by decision-making 
should play some role in the making of those decisions.  As half of the 
world, women are equally impacted by the decisions of international courts.  
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Even if men and women were identical in their identification and 
interpretation of relevant facts and application of law, it would still be 
problematic to have all female benches or all male benches.  Furthermore, if 
these groups are identical in their reasoning and approach to legal analysis, 
how can we justify the systematic exclusion of one of them?  
Opponents of electoral quotas have argued that they “facilitate 
access for ‘unqualified’ women with little interest in promoting women’s 
concerns” and “reinforce stereotypes about women’s inferiority as political 
actors.”
289
  Similar arguments could be made concerning mandatory judicial 
quotas. If women are less qualified and replace more qualified male 
candidates, their presence may detract from the authority of international 
courts, and therefore, be ill-advised.  Less incentive exists to respect and 
comply with the decisions of international courts if the judges are not of 
high caliber.  Because of the small number of international judge positions 
in the world – a few hundred at most – arguments about qualifications are 
more difficult to make in this context than in domestic political elections.  
Surely there are three women qualified to sit on the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, the WTO Appellate Body and the ECOWAS Court. And 
there must be more than only one woman in the entire world qualified to 
serve on the Law of the Sea Tribunal.  Further, as described above, it is not 
at all clear that merit is what motivates many judicial appointments in the 
first place.
290
  In other words, the argument that women are “unqualified” 
has little purchase when judicial nominees are often selected to reward 
political loyalty or because of their relationships with nominators.  
Another counter-argument to mandatory targets is that its 
beneficiaries may be perceived as somehow inferior or less capable than 
their male peers, even if they are equally or even more qualified.  
Alternatively stated, women would not be in the courtroom but for the 
quota.  A quota and the corresponding perceived drop in the qualifications 
of judges is dangerous for the authority of the court.  The problem is that 
current selection procedures appear to be keeping qualified women off the 
bench, not that a quota would put unqualified women on it.  Put otherwise, 
it is simply inconceivable that no French or Russian woman is qualified to 
serve as a permanent international judge. As for a failure to promote 
“women’s concerns,” should men’s presence on the bench be justified on 
                                                 
289
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the basis of their ability to promote “men’s concerns”?  Is this a litmus test 
to be applied to all judges, or just female ones? Furthermore, the presence 
of diversity in leadership is important for other reasons as well, such as non-
discrimination in employment opportunity, opening doors to other 
previously excluded groups and democratic legitimacy.   
If states decide they want women on the bench in greater numbers, 
but do not want to give up tight control over who ultimately gets nominated 
and selected, they may prefer quotas or aspirational targets over more 
sweeping reforms to national nomination and international election 
procedures. More sex representative benches may be more impartial, if and 
when men and women judge differently, or be perceived to be more 
impartial, even if men and women do not differ in their decision-making.  
And more balanced benches would confer greater democratic legitimacy on 
these courts, simply because more of humanity would be on the bench.  
Since states have already agreed to quotas or aspirational targets for the 
International Criminal Court, the European Court of Human Rights, the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and to a lesser extent in the 
ICTY and the ICTR, they may be willing to do so for more international 
courts.  On the other hand, states may choose to craft more transparent and 
merit-driven selection procedures, which appear to help open the 




Almost a quarter century after feminist approaches made their way into 
international legal scholarship, women continue to be present in paltry 
numbers in many international institutions, including international courts.   
While women do occupy more seats today on most courts than 24 years 
ago, on courts with no representation requirements, men usually take up at 
least 80% of the bench.        
 A smaller pool of available candidates is an unpersuasive and 
problematic justification for the status quo.  First, the data does not support 
it.  States with higher percentages of women lawyers have not necessarily 
appointed more women as the pool has grown.  Some states with lower 
percentages of women lawyers appear to appoint more women to the bench 
than those with higher percentages. And the percentage of women judges 
has dropped on some courts, or appears frozen at one or two women on the 
bench, although it is reasonable to assume the pool has grown over time.   
Women occupied the same number of seats on the IACHR in June 2015 as 
they did in 1991.  The percentage of female ad litem judges has dropped 
dramatically on both the ICTY and the ICTR over time.  Only one woman 
has ever served on ITLOS’s 21-member bench in almost twenty years, and 
80 SHATTERING THE GLASS CEILING [1-Aug-15 
the African Court has never exceeded two women on its eleven member 
bench.  
 Second, in many cases, merit does not appear to be driving the 
judicial selection process in the first place.  If merit is not at the heart of the 
process, then there is no reason to suppose that the pool of women 
candidates is any smaller than the pool of male ones, or that naming women 
would result in a less meritorious bench.  Third, to the extent the pool 
appears smaller for international courts than domestic ones, glass ceilings 
and discrimination in the domestic context are at least partly at fault. 
Declining to promote more women on this basis merely recreates and 
reinforces the glass ceiling at the international level. Fourth, the number of 
judicial slots available per year is quite low; a huge pool of women 
candidates is not necessary to achieve a balanced bench.   
 Compelling reasons exist to seek a balanced representation of the 
sexes on international court benches.  Not only does appointing more 
women create more equitable employment opportunities for women who 
seek to become international judges, but also, it can create important ripple 
effects. These include greater employment opportunities for women at the 
domestic level and as counsel before international courts, in addition to new 
mentorship opportunities and perhaps greater intent to participate in 
international legal affairs among girls and women.
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 Finally, as previously 
described, greater balance on the bench will strengthen courts’ normative, 
sociological and democratic legitimacy.    
 States may choose from different options for achieving a more 
balanced bench.  These include more transparency and rigor in selection 
procedures at the national nomination and international election levels, as 
well as participation by a broader array of stakeholders.  Such measures 
would reduce both the likelihood and perception of bias and cronyism in 
judicial selection, as well as push nominators to move beyond their own 
contact lists and encourage a more diverse slate of individuals to apply.  
Aspirational statements concerning sex representativeness may also be 
useful in bringing attention to the issue of fair representation and in 
encouraging states to nominate and vote for female candidates.  Finally, if 
these steps do not achieve sex representative benches, temporary mandatory 
quotas may be necessary to ensure that women get a fair opportunity to 
serve on international court benches.  
  The problem is clear.  The time has come to fix it.  
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